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THE BROKEN MEDICARE APPEALS
SYSTEM: FAILED REGULATORY
SOLUTIONS AND THE PROMISE OF
FEDERAL LITIGATION
Greer Donleyt
ABSTRACT

The Medicare Appeals System is broken. For years, the System has
been unable to accommodate a growing number of appeals. The result
is a backlog so large that even if 11o new appeals were filed, it would
take the System a decade or more to empty. Healthcare providers wait
many years for their appeals to be heard before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), and because the government recoups providers' Medicare
payments while they wait, the delays cause them serious financial harm.
Even worse, providers are more likely than not to prevail before the
ALJ, proving that the payment should never have been recouped in the
first place. The financial pressure on providers creates widespread
reverberations in the healthcare market, and consumers ultimately pay
the price. Nevertheless, the government appears unwilling or unable to
fix the problem.
This Article explores how the System works, why the System broke,
and what legal or legislative remedy could solve its problems. The
Article articulates the central concern underlying the System's backlog:
small providers lack the liquidity and revenue stream to endure the
uncertainty and delayed gratification that is now required to participate
in the Medicare Program. As a result, these companies collapse or are
purchased by larger providers-contributing to the consolidation of the
healthcare market. An optimal remedy would relieve the pressure small
providers face; it could be achieved by delaying the government's ability
to recoup Medicare payments before the provider has received an ALJ
determination. Though legislative or administrative action could most
easily accomplish this goal, providers have asked the judiciary to step
in where the government is failing. Of the various legal challenges that
providers have lodged against the government to protest the System's
delays, the one most likely to help small providers is under the Due
Process Clause. This Article concludes that a due process challengethough difficult to whi-could have merit and might be small providers'
best chance of obtaiing relief, at least in the short term.
t

As of August 1, 2018, Greer Donley will be an Assistant Professor at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. She would like to thank Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Margo Schlanger, and Nicholson Price for their very helpful
feedback on earlier drafts of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past six years, the Medicare Appeals System ("System"),
which handles appeals from Medicare payment determinations, has
experienced extreme bureaucratic inefficiency. The problems began in
2010 when Congress implemented a new Medicare auditing program.'

1.

See, Andrew Wachler and Jessica Forster, GAO Releases Report
Outlining Continued Inefficiencies with the Medicare Appeals System and
the Increasing Appeals Backlog, ABA, https://www.americanbar.o
rg/publications/aba healthesource/2015-2016/august/appe
alsbacklog.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) and CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
&MEDICAID

SERVS., RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE IN FOR FISCAL

YEAR 2014 (2015). https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data- andSystems/ Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/
Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/RAC-RTC-FY2014.pdf
[hereinafter RECOVERY AUDITING].
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This program dramatically increased the number of appeals entering
the System, but did not expand the budget or modify the System's
structure to accommodate the influx. 2 By the end of 2015, the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") admitted that the
System was so backlogged that it could take eleven years for the
System's Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") to resolve the appeals
pending before them, even assuming no new appeals were filed.3
This backlog has caused enormous delays. Though Medicare
providers are statutorily entitled to an ALJ determination within ninety
days, the average provider waits at least three years. And as they wait,
the government recoups providers' money as if it has already wonoften totaling millions of dollars per provider.' This early recoupment
would be justified by administrative efficiency if the underlying decisions
were generally correct, but in reality, a significant proportion of these
recoupments are erroneous and eventually returned. Delays associated
with the backlog have hit small providers particularly hard.7 Many
small providers face insolvency as they wait for an ALJ determinationa dynamic that exacerbates systemic healthcare problems for consumers.
Most notably, it contributes to the consolidation of the healthcare market,
which reduces competition and increases prices.
Despite the government's awareness of and attention to the
situation, HHS8 has been unable to control the increasing number of
appeals entering the System. The agency has requested additional
funding from Congress for four years in a row, finalized a rule aimed at
streamlining the System, and lobbied for legislative solutions.
2.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1; U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO-16-366,

MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN TO
IMPROVE APPEALS PROCESS 19-20 (2016) [hereinafter MEDICARE FEE FOR
SERVICE].
3.

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

HEALTH

&

HUMAN

SERVS.,

HHS

https://www.hhs.gov/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf
Mar. 26, 2018) [hereinafter HHS PRIMER].

PRIMER,

7,

(last visited

4.

MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE, supra note 2, at 1, 10,18.

5.

Id. at 2.

6.

Id. at 69.

7.

See Hirschfield, Marc E. & Skapof, Marc, Healthcare Providers Face
Increasing Financial Pressure And Bankruptcy Risk, MONDAQ,(June 26,
2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/323360/Healthcare/H
ealthcare+Providers+Face+Increasing+Financial+Pressure+And+Bank
ruptcy+Risk.

8.

HHS is an umbrella agency that oversees many of the agencies at issue
in this Article.

9.

MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE, supra note 2, at 38-39; Medicare Program:
Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, 60 Fed. Reg. 4974 (Jan.

17, 2017).
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Nevertheless, Congress has failed to hicrease the budget or legislate
reforms. And there is little evidence that the agency's administrative
reforms will impact the backlog in any significant way.
Once it became clear that lobbying efforts were unlikely to be
successful, both large and small Medicare providers took their
complahits to the federal courts, pursuing different legal strategies that
reflected their various needs. These efforts largely failed early on, but
starthig in late 2015, the courts became more receptive to these
challenges. The litigation surrounding the System's delays presents an
interesting case study on how the federal courts, though reluctant, can
intervene when private parties, agencies, and Congress cannot solve
administrative problems on their own. Unlike the legislature, however,
the judiciary's solutions are necessarily limited by the nature of the
relief sought. One provider group, for histance, obtahied a writ of
mandamus, which ordered the government to empty the backlog and
comply with the System's statutory deadlines. But mandamus is an
imperfect remedy: even if the writ reduces the backlog of appeals, it
will do so at the expense of small providers and further perpetuate some
of the problems associated with the System's delays. A successful due
process challenge, on the other hand, could create an optimal remedy
by relieving the pressure small providers experience while waiting for
an ALJ hearing.
This Article explores how the System became so backlogged, why
administrative solutions have failed, and what the best legal remedy
could be. In Section I, I explain the process by which CMS or its
contractors initially pay Medicare providers and subsequently identify and
recoup overpayments. In Section II, I explore the System as Congress
initially envisioned it, how it currently functions, and why it became so
dysfunctional. Next, in Section III, I discuss how the delays associated
with the System's backlog play hito problems that affect our healthcare
market as a whole. Section IV then discusses the various regulatory and
legislative proposals, explaiing why these attempted solutions have
failed, and how the agency or legislature could create meaningful
change.
Finally, in Section V, I explore two different kinds of legal
challenges: mandamus and due process. The former aims to force
compliance with the ninety-day statutory timelhie, while the latter
seeks to delay recoupment until after an ALJ hearing. Though only
mandamus has been successful thus far, this Article argues a remedy in
due process will provide more protection for small businesses, and
consequently, consumers. While small providers have achieved some
preliminary relief in their due process challenges, they all settled their
cases with the agency before the merits were reached. This result is
unsurprising given that small providers generally lack the financial
capacity or incentive to litigate the issue to finality. This section
concludes that a due process challenge has merit, and if small providers
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can overcome the obstacles inherent in litigating a due process claim,
it may present their best chance at achieving the desired result absent
legislative action.
I.

BILLING MEDICARE:

How CMS

PAYS AND REVIEWS

MEDICARE CLAIMS

The government provides health insurance for individuals over
sixty-five or who live with disabilities through the Medicare program.10
The government is the largest single healthcare payer in the United
States, and as a result, it has a large and disproportionate influence on
the healthcare market. Most healthcare providers and suppliers 12 treat
at least some Medicare patients,13 though certain providers do not
generally service any Medicare enrollees (e.g. pediatricians) and others
treat a disproportionately high number Medicare beneficiaries (e.g.,
hospice providers)." Providers can also refuse to accept Medicare

10.

An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 2017),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-an-overview-of-medicare.
Medicare beneficiaries can choose to enroll in either Medicare or Medicare
Advantage ("MA") health plans. Id. Private health insurers administer
MA plans and the government pays private insurers to cover beneficiaries
on behalf of the government. Id.

11.

Tevi Troy, How the Government as a Payer Shapes the Health Care
Marketplace, AM. HEALTH POL'Y INST,
http://www.americanhea
lthpolicy. org/Content/documents/resources/Governmentas Payer_12
012015.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).

12.

In this Article, I use the term provider to include both providers and
suppliers. According to the statute: provider "means a hospital, critical
access hospital, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient
rehabilitation facility, home health agency, hospice program, or, for
purposes of section 1814(g) and section 1835(e), a fund." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(u) (2010). The statute defines suppliers to "mean[], unless the
context otherwise requires, a physician or other practitioner, a facility,
or other entity (other than a provider of services) that furnishes items
or services under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(d) (2010). Healthcare
"providers"
include hospitals and other healthcare facilities,
physicians' groups, and product manufacturers to the extent their
services or products are accepted for Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP
reimbursement, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2006).

13.

Thomas Beaton, Providers Seeing Even Mix of Public, Commercially
Insured Patients, HEALTH PAYER INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/providers-seeing-even-mix-ofpublic-commercially-insured-patients.

14.

Greg Bengel, Doctors Refuse to Accept Medicare Patients, HEALTH IT
OUTCOMES (Aug.
9, 2013),
https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/
doctors-refuse-to-accept- medicare-patients-0001.
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patients and, though it remains unusual, it is becoming more common
for certain providers to do so."
After treating a Medicare patient, a provider submits a claim for
payment to the government. If the government approves the claim, then
the provider receives compensation. 6 In this way, Medicare functions like
any health insurer: it contracts with providers to treat its beneficiaries
in exchange for payment.17 CMS, however, does not function as the
insurer itself; rather, it contracts with Medicare Administrative
Contractors ("MACs") to perform various insurance functions on its
behalf." For instance, MACs review providers' claims for payment and
pay providers for approved claims. 9
When a provider submits a claim for payment, MACs conduct a
prepayment review to determine whether the claim meets Medicare's
conditions of payment. 20 Contractors create a system that automatically
pays certain claims, automatically denies certain claims, and tags other
claims for additional review*21 Whether a claim is automatically paid or
queued for further review is determined based on risk-i.e., contractors
determine that certain claims are at a high risk for overbilling and are
therefore reviewed more thoroughly before payment.22 The vast
majority of claims are considered low-risk and may be paid
15.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OPTING OUT OF MEDICARE
AND/OR ELECTING TO ORDER AND CERTIFY ITEMS AND SERVICES TO

MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (Sept.
2015),
https://www.cms.gov/O
utreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLN
MattersArticles/downloads/SE1311.pdf; Melinda Beck, More Doctors
Steer Clear of Medicare, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323971
204578626151017241898.

§ 1395g(a) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a) (2010).

16.

See e.g., 42 U.S.C.

17.

See What's Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/signup-change-plans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-ismedicare.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).

18.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW

PROGRAMS,
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/MCRPBooklet.pdf
(last updated Sept. 2016) [hereinafter MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW
PROGRAMS].

19.

What is a MA C, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-Admi
nistrative-Contractors/What-is-a- MAC.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).

20.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY

MANUAL,
§3.2,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Guidance/Manuals/downloads/pim83c03.pdf (last updated Nov. 9, 2017)
[hereinafter MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL].
21.

Id. at §3.2.B.

22.

Id., at §3.2.1.

274

HEALTH MATRIX - VOLUME 28 - ISSUE 1 - 2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

automatically or semi-automatically with little oversight. 23 This
assessment is called Non-Complex Review because it does not evaluate
the medical documentation supporting the claim, but rather confirms
certain conditions of payment are met by computer systems or nonexpert coders. 24 Such claims can be automatically denied, for instance,
if the provider submits the claim with missing, or clearly incorrect
information. 25 Factors such as device delivery dates and length of stay
requirements can also form a more substantive basis to quickly reject
or accept the claim. 26
A small number of flagged claims, however, are reviewed under
Complex Review prior to payment; this involves a medical professional
or claims analyst analyzing the claim to ensure it is "for a service or device
that is medically reasonable and necessary." 27 Complex Review is not rote;
it involves an assessment of the claim's medical documentation-such as
physician notes, medical charts, and diagnosis codes by an expert
reviewer. 28 Contractors reviewing these claims may request additional
documentation before approving or denying them. 29 Complex Review is
time consuming and expensive; contractors cannot use it to review
every claim before payment. Instead, contractors "target their efforts
at error prevention to those services and items that pose the greatest
financial risk to the Medicare program and that represent the best
investment of resources."3 0 Contractors flag claims as high risk-and
therefore conduct Complex Review-for many reasons. For instance,
the claim may be expensive, frequently billed, or use a diagnosis or
procedure code with a history of incorrect billing.3 1 Tracking claims in
this way allows contractors to review a small number of the riskiest
claims in depth while still paying providers quickly for the majority of
3 2
their services.

23.

See e.g., Gulfcoast Med. Supply v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Case No. 8:04-CV-2610-T-26EAJ, 2005 WL 3934860 *2 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 16, 2005) (citations omitted), aff'd 468 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006)
("1 []nitial payment for services under Medicare is ordinarily made as long
as the [Medicare] claim does not contain glaring irregularities on its
face.").

24.

See MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 18.

25.

Id. at

26.

Id. at

§ 3.2.A.
§ 3.2.1.2.

27.

Id. at

§ 3.2.1.1.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at § 3.2.1.
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The result of prepayment review-whether Non-Complex or
Complex-is called the Initial Determination. 3 3 If the Initial
Determination approves a claim, the provider is paid according to a
price outlined by federal law and regulations.3 4 If the Initial
Determination denies a claim, the provider is not paid, but can resubmit
it or challenge the denial through the System.35 Though the Initial
Determination forms the basis of payment, it is only the beginning of
the government's review. Following payment-often many years laterdifferent kinds of Medicare contractors or government agencies can
review claims again through post-payment audits.3 6
Post-payment review is typically Complex, involving a deep dive
into the medical documentation to determine whether each claim meets
Medicare requirements.3 7 Errors generally result from insufficient medical
documentation to support the intervention, medical documentation that
supports a different code than was billed, or lack of medical necessity
in the documentation submitted.3 8 Like prepayment reviews, these postpayment audits usually involve a review of certain high-risk claims as
opposed to the provider's entire claim history. Because audits can occur
up to three years after payment, the government can target its reviews
based on data from an earlier payment year.3 9 For example, in 2012,
the government could retrospectively analyze the 2010 payment data,
find a suspicious uptick of the billing for a certain procedure code, and
then in 2013, conduct wide-ranging audits of providers' use of that code
in 2010.40 When a post-payment auditor decides that the claim should
never have been paid, the government will issue an overpayment
determination, which requires the provider to repay the funds. 1

33.

MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 20.

34.

See e.g., MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 20; see e.g.,
MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL,

supra note 20.

35.

See infra Section II.

36.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 52. For an
examination of the different kinds of Medicare contractors, see Don
Romano & Jennifer Colagiovanni, The Alphabet Soup of Medicare and
Medicaid Contractors, 27 HEALTH L. 6, 1 (2015). Some of the most
extensive post-payment reviews are conducted by the Medical Review
Program, the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing Program, the
Recovery Audit Program, and the Office of the Inspector General.
MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 18.

37.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL,

38.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19.

supra note 20.

39.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1.

40.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19, at 8-9.

41.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19.
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Post-payment review is a vital part of protecting the Medicare trust
funds.4 2 Because MACs cannot review every claim before payment,
post-payment review allows the government to retrospectively identify
incorrectly paid claims.
Returning these overpayments to the
government helps to ensure the sustainability of the Medicare
program." For instance, in 2016, roughly eleven percent of Medicare
claims were improper, corresponding to roughly $41.1 billion in
overpayments. 5 Without post-payment review, that money would not
have been returned to the government. Post-payment audits can also
help the government identify fraud, or the intentional submission of
false Medicare claims.4 6 It is important to remember, however, that
overpayments are separate and distinct from fraud. Fraud indicates
that the provider knowingly deceived the government, whereas an
overpayment is the result of the provider's genuine mistake.47 Even
though the government's ability to conduct post-payment review is
vital, in recent years, the nature of post-payment audits has shifted in
two fundamental ways that raise questions about the integrity of postpayment audits.
First, post-payment auditors have increasingly chosen to use
extrapolation in their reviews. Extrapolation allows auditors to review
a small sample of claims and then apply the findings to the provider's

42.

Medicare is paid for by two trust funds, which are supported through taxes
and premiums. See generally How is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-medicare-is-funded/medicarefunding.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).

43.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19.

44.

See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Accidental Administrative Law of the
Medicare Program, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y & ETHICS 1, 130-32 (2015).
Because Medicare developed into a procurement program, the government
developed mechanisms to help it combat the inevitable fraud that
developed. Id.

45.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICE 2016 IMPROPER PAYMENTS

SERVICES, MEDICARE FEE-FORREPORT, https://www.cms.gov/

Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/MedicareFFS-Compliance-Programs/CERT/Downloads/MedicareFeeforService
2016ImproperPaymentsReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
46.

The False Claims Act, for instance, requires the government to prove that
a provider knowingly submitted a false claim for payment. A person acts
knowingly under the Act if s/he "(i) has actual knowledge of the
information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2010).

47.

Medicare Overpayments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct.
2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/overpayme
ntbrochure508-09.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS].
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entire set of claims for that particular fiscal year ("Y"). 4 For example,
assume that a provider submitted-and received payment for-one
thousand inpatient hospital claims."9 Assume further that the
government decided to audit these claims. If a post-payment auditor
reviewed only twenty of them, concluding that five of the twenty should
not have been paid, 0 then the provider must repay the government
twenty-five percent of the payments it received for all one thousand
inpatient claims. In other words, the reviewer will deem 250 claims as
overpaid even though it only found five claims deficient.
This tactic allows the government to commit fewer resources to its
audits while at the same time recouping more money. 1 Providers,
however, can face enormous financial consequence as a result of these
extrapolated audits.5 2 Providers have sued on this issue, claiming that
the government should not use extrapolation, or at the very least,
should be required to use the most accurate statistical modeling.5 3
Courts have not been persuaded. Instead, courts have deferred to the

48.

See Chaves County Home Health Servs. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); QIG Extrapolation in Medicare Compliance Review Triples
Hospital's Overpayment, 22 REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE 20 (June

3, 2013).
49.

This example was chosen intentionally. RACs have focused a great deal
of attention on inpatient claims. Hospitals are paid more for inpatient
claims than observation claims. If a RAC concludes that a hospital should
have observed a patient rather than admitted the patient, then the whole
claim is deemed an overpayment, even though the hospital would have
been eligible for a portion of that payment had it initially billed the
government for observation. This surprising result has been challenged
unsuccessfully in federal court. Bagnall v. Sebelius, No. 3:11CV1703, 2013
WL 5346659 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2013).

50.

For instance, the review could determine that the patients should not
have been admitted, but rather kept in observation, which the
government reimburses at a lower rate to the hospital. See discussion in
supra notes 52.

51.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL

YEAR

2016,

(Jan.

2017),

https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/

hcfac/FY2016-hcfac.pdf
52.

See e.g., Am. Health Ass'n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
("This problem takes a particular toll on hospitals with a large share of
patients who rely on Medicare"); Press Release, Am. Orthotic Prosthetic
Ass'n, Study: Medicare Audit "Mess" Surging At Rate Of 15,000 New
Appeals Per Week, Agency Could Avoid Rapidly Mounting Interest
Payments, (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.aopanet.org/2015/03/studymedicare-audit-mess-surging-at-rate-of-15000-new-appeals-per-weekagency-could-avoid-rapidly-mounting-interest-payments/ [hereinafter
Press Release].

53.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL,

supra note 20.
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agency to dictate the procedures of their audits.
The use of
extrapolation itself is less concerning than the fact that the agency is
not held accountable to the statistical methods it utilizes, even if it
adopts second-tier methods with big financial impact. 5
Second, Congress created the Recovery Audit Program ("RAP"),
implemented in 2010, which generated a new type of post-payment
audit and increased the number of post-payment reviews." The RAP
designated Recovery Audit Contractors ("RACs") to conduct RAP
audits. 7 By statute, RACs are paid on a contingency fee-i.e., they
collect a portion of the overpayments they identify. 8 CMS currently
pays RACs between nine and twelve and a half percent of the
overpayments they identify, based on a competitive bidding process. 9
However, for certain kinds of audits, CMS has increased that percentage
to seventeen and a half percent. 0
This incentive structure has caused providers alarm, and many see
RACs as "bounty hunters" looking for overpayments at the expense of

54.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2010) (authorizes Medicare contractors to use
extrapolation to determine overpayment amounts when the Secretary
determines that, "there is a sustained or high level of payment error or
documented educational intervention has failed to correct the payment
error." Once this threshold finding is made, the provider has no means of
challenging it.) Gentiva Healthcare v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 292, 297 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).

55.

Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful at challenging the validity of the
sampling and extrapolation method courts have held that CMS or its
contractor need not undertake the most precise sampling methodology so
long as the method used is statistically valid. In the Case of Michael King,
No. M.-10-321, 2011 WL 6960267, at *10 (May 10, 2011); Martin v. Life
Care Centers of America, Inc., 114 F.Supp.3d 549, 572 (E.D. TN 2014);
Pruchniewski v. Leavitt, No. 8:04-CV-2200-T-23TBM, 2006 WL 2331071,

at *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2006).
56.

Facts About The Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, AM. HosP.
AsS'N,
2
(2014),
http://www.aha.org/content/13/fs-hrl250rac.pdf
[hereinafter AM. HOSPITAL Ass'N ].

57.

Kinney, supra note 47, at 130-32.

58.

Id. ("RACs are paid by CMS on a 'contingency fee' basis, which means
they are paid a commission on each claim that they deny. RACs are
currently reimbursed 9-12.5 percent of the Medicare payments they
deny."); Hospital Survey Report: The Real Cost of the Inefficient
Medicare RAC Program, AM. HosP. Ass'N., 2 (2015), http://www.aha
.org/content/15/hospsurveyreport.pdf [hereinafter HospitalSurvey Report].

59.

Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037,

69,044 (Nov. 10, 2010).
60.

Medicaid Program; Announcement of Medicaid Recovery Audit
Contractors (RACs) Contingency Fee Update, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,127, 11,127
(Feb. 24, 2012).
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physicians and hospitals." Members of Congress have similarly
expressed discomfort with the financial incentives imbedded within the
RAP. In a letter to the Secretary of HHS, these Congressmen stated:
"due to this payment structure, RACs are incentivized to deny claims,
even when the claims are correct."6 2 Moreover, the time and expense
providers must hicur in hosting auditors and gathering medical
documentation further antagonizes the relationship between RACs and
providers.6 3 Expenses associated with RAC audits and appeals can
exceed $100,000 per audit for many hospitals.
Nevertheless, the RAP has been very successful for CMS: in 2014,
RACs identified $2.39 billion in overpayments. 5 But RAC audits also
dramatically hicreased the number of "overpaid" claims that are later
overturned through the Medicare Appeals System.6 6 According to the
American Hospital Association ("AHA"), RACs deem nearly half of the
claims they review to be invalid overpayments. Of the RAC
determinations that are appealed, some estimate that more than
seventy percent are overturned on appeal. 7 Because of the high reversal
percentage and the contingency fees paid to contractors, only $1.6
billion of the $2.39 billion in RAC-identified overpayments were
returned to the Medicare trust fund in 2014.68 Fortunately, when a
RAC's overpayment determination is overturned, RACs must repay the
contingency fee.6

61.

AM. HOSPITAL ASS'N, supra note 57 ("Hospitals Need a Level Playing
Field with RAC Bounty Hunters"); AM. MED. AsS'N, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION

FACT SHEET

MEDICARE

RECOVERY

AUDI

CONTRACTOR

(RAC)
PROGRAM
APPEALS,
https://resourcesforrisk.com/_defa
ult/download/downloadfreedoc.php?file=Recovery+Audit+Contract
o rs+Fact+Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) ("The AMA remains
deeply opposed to utilization of contingencies for RACs since it is a
bounty hunter-like program that creates a financial incentive for RACs to
identify overpayments.").
62.

Letter from Members of Congress, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of
Department of Health and Human Services (Feb. 10, 2014) available at:
http://www.aha.org/content/14/140210-let-congress-hhs.pdf.

63.

Hospital Survey Report, supra note 58, at 3-4.

64.

AM. HOSP. ASS'N, supra note 57.

65.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1, at 13.

66.

AM. HOSP. ASS'N, supra note 57.

67.

Id. at 5; Lisa A. Eramo, RAC Appeals: Should You Bother?, 25 FOR THE
RECORD 10, 14, (July 2013), http://www.fortherecordmag.com/archi
ves/0713pl4.shtml.

68.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1.

69.

Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037,

69,039 (Nov. 10, 2010).
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The nature of Complex post-payment review makes bias
particularly problematic. One of the most subjective conditions of
payment that contractors review is medical necessity.7 0 Medical
necessity review involves a complex, fact-based assessment, where
Medicare contractors-looking for flaws-can scrutinize medical
documentation with the benefit of hindsight to identify services they
deem medically unnecessary.71 The reviewer can second-guess the
medical judgment of the doctor even if she is not a physician herself or
in the same specialty as the original physician. 72 Other requirements are
equally frustrating for providers. For instance, providers may need to
wait a certain number of months from the patient's initial complaint
before ordering certain interventions, see a patient face-to-face, or
record specific facts about the patient in the medical chart to justify
ordering a test or procedure.73 The list is extensive and many of these
regulations are technical and constantly changing.74
In Caring Hearts Personal Home Services v. Burwell, the Tenth
Circuit questioned the complexity and number of CMS regulations.75
The court wondered whether Medicare laws have become so byzantine
that the agency has lost control of them.76 In this case, the plaintiff
challenged a Medicare appeals determination within the Medicare Appeals
System.77 The provider argued that regulations it allegedly failed to meet
were not in effect when the claims at issue were submitted; instead, it
claimed, the reviewer erroneously applied regulations implemented in
2013 to 2010 claims.78 The court agreed and chastised the agency and
the four arbiters in the System for failing to keep track of the rules it
promulgated:
This case has taken us to a strange world where the government
itself the very "expert" agency responsible for promulgating the "law"
70.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 27-28.

71.

Id. at 65.

72.

AM. AM. HOSPITAL ASS'N, supra note 57 ("Despite protests by the AMA
that RAC audits involving complex medical reviews be performed by a
physician of the same specialty and the same of the physician under
review" RACs will use "nurses, therapists, and certified coders to review
claims.").

73.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 34.

74.

See CMS, ICD-10-CM OFFICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CODING AND REPORTING

FY 2018, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/ICD10/Downloads
/2018-ICD-10-CM-Coding-Guidelines.pdf (last visited March 24, 2018).
75.

Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 976-77 (10th
Cir. 2016).

76.

Id.

77.

See id.

78.

Id. at 970
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no less-seems unable to keep pace with its own frenetic lawmaking. A
world Madison worried about long ago, a world in which the laws are
" so voluminous they cannot be read" and constitutional norms of due
process, fair notice, and even the separation of powers seem very much
at stake. But whatever else one might say about our visit to this place,
one thing seems to us certain: an agency decision that loses track of its
own controlling regulations and applies the wrong rules in order to
penalize private citizens can never stand.79
This case highlights the expanding regulatory burden that Medicare
providers face. Providers must keep track of the government's
voluminous and expanding regulations to defend their right to
compensation for the services they provide. The government can review
their claims retrospectively using post-payment auditors that have
known conflicts of interest. And with extrapolation, a mistake on one
claim can cost providers millions of dollars, even if the physician
provided the services in good faith. These flaws do not call for an
elimination of post-payment audits, but underscore the paramount need
for fair appeals with sufficient procedural protections to mitigate any
risk of abuse. As explored below, it is not clear that providers are
sufficiently protected by the System as it functions today.
II.
A.

THE MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM

Statutory Framework for Medicare Appeals

The process for appealing a Medicare overpayment determination
involves four steps: Redetermination, Reconsideration, ALJ hearing,
and Department of Appeals Board ("DAB") Review. 0 MACs and
Qualified Independent Contractors ("QICs"), which are both Medicare
contractors paid by CMS, render the first two levels of review
(Redetermination and Reconsideration respectively). By contrast, the
Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals ("OMHA"), which employs
the ALJs and DAB members, is located outside CMS and is therefore
more independent from the agency.8 2 These four steps of appeal
constitute the Medicare Appeals System, and only after a provider

79.

Id.

80.

42 U.S.C.

81.

§

1395ff (2010); see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
A & B. APPEALS PROCESS, 3, https://www.cm
s.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLN
Products/downloads/MedicareAppealsprocess.pdf
(last updated June
2017) [hereinafter MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM].
MEDICARE

PARTS

MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 80, at 6-7; MEDICARE INTEGRITY

MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
82.

OMHA is housed under HHS, but not under CMS. HHS PRIMER, supra
note 3.
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proceeds through them can they challenge the overpayment
determination in federal court.8 3
CMS's recoupment authority is tied to the System. After CMS
conducts a post-payment review and renders an overpayment
determination, the govermnent issues a demand letter. The letter gives
the provider thirty days upon receipt to lodge an appeal against some,
or all, of the post-payment review results. 5 Post-payment audit results
that are not challenged within thirty days are subject to immediate
recoupment.86 If a provider challenges the audit, however, the appeal
enters the System, and the government cannot recoup those payments
until after Reconsideration and Redetermination. 7 CMS may, however,
recoup overpayments before the ALJ determination, even if the
Reconsideration decision is being appealed to the ALJ. 8 Recoupment
allows the government to either demand repayment or to withhold
future payments from providers to compensate the debt. 9
The statute creating the System requires completion of each step
in the appeals process within a certain timeframe. Redetermination and
Reconsideration must be completed within sixty days of the provider's
request for the corresponding level of appeal. 0 An ALJ must render a
determination within ninety days of the provider's initial request for
review. 1 Within this timeframe, the ALJ must conduct and conclude
its hearing and render a decision.9 2 The fourth step-DAB reviewmust also be completed within ninety days of the provider's request for
it.9 As explored below, these timelines have become meaningless and
the System no longer functions as it was designed.

83.

Statutes prohibit parties from challenging an appeal in court before
completing all four steps in the administrative appeals process. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(h) (2010).
84.

MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

85.

Id.

86.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT
(935) FOR PROVIDER, PHYSICIANS AND SUPPLIERS OVERPAYMENTS (Sept.

29,
2008),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network- MLN/MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/MM6183.pdf
[hereinafter LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT].
87.

Id.; MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

88.

Id.

89.

MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

90.

42 U.S.C.

§ 1395ff(a)(3)(C) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C) (2010);

see MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 84.
91.

42 U.S.C.

92.

Id.

93.

42 U.S.C.

§

1395ff(d)(1)(A)

(2010).

§

1395ff(d)(2)(A)

(2010).
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Name
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Po"I-arnn Rev IIe Findsk an
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Step One

Redetermination

MAC (under CMS)

60 days

Step Two

Reconsideration

QIC (under CMS)

60 days

>CNM$MLIY B i' e p
Step

wit~ima G

Determination by ALJ

i III(I

ALJ (under

Three

OMHA)

Step Four Determination by DAB

DAB (under

90 days
90 days

OMHA)
Po

(ivel )~O~1
Ih
ylIllp ill I

B.

r I, I t,o

The System in Practice: Then and Now

Until 2010, the System largely functioned according to the
statutory deadlines.' Prior to 2010, processing the ALJ hearing and
determination took an average of ninety-five days." When providers
receive timely decisions, the financial burden associated with erroneous
recoupment is less significant because the government reimburses the
provider quickly-i.e., the provider is not deprived access to its funds
for long. 6 Further, when the System functions according to the
statutory timeline, it properly balances the government's interest in
collecting valid overpayments against providers' harm in having their
payments erroneously recouped.
When CMS implemented the RAP in 2010, it caused a dramatic
increase in appeals entering the System, clogging it up. There are two
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-366, MEDICARE FEE-FORSERVICE: OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN To IMPROVE APPEALS PROCESS 69 (2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677034.pdf
[hereinafter
GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE]; Adjudication Timeframes, Dep't Health
Human Services., Office of Medicare Hearings & Appeals (last
updated
Apr.
29,
2015),
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/impor
tant notice regarding adjudication timeframes.html [hereinafter
Adjudication Timeframes].

95.

See Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 94.

96.

When the hearing and determination occurs as the statute requires, then
an erroneous denial would deny providers funds for a maximum of five
months: providers have 60 days to lodge their appeal and ALJs have 90
days to render a decision. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010). In practice,
this is much shorter given that recoupment often does not start
immediately, see 42 U.S.C. §1395fff(a)(3)(C)(ii) and § 1395ff(d)(1)(A)

&

94.

(2010).
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reasons that the RAP caused an influx of appeals: first, there were
simply more post-payment audits for providers to challenge, and
second, providers were more likely to challenge RAC findings because
they were suspicious of RACs' financial incentives. 7 When Congress
created the RAP, it did not expand OMHA's budget to accommodate
the predictable increase in appeals, 8 and as a result, providers blame
this program for the System's ballooning delays." CMS concedes that
this program has significantly contributed to the increase in appeals,
but also points to other factors that have played a role-such as the
aging of the baby boomers, which increased the number of Medicare
beneficiaries (and therefore the number of claims CMS needs to review,
which can be appealed).100
Providers are particularly troubled by the delays associated with
step three of the System, where they receive an ALJ hearing. Between
2009 and 2014, "the number of requests for an ALJ hearing or review
increased 1,222%,"101 but the budget for OMHA, the office responsible
for Medicare's ALJ appeals, increased by only sixteen percent from
2010 to 2014.102 By the end of 2015, OMHA received "more than a
year's worth of appeals every eighteen weeks." 103 Assuming it received
no new appeals, it would take OMHA eleven years to work through the
backlog of appeals.104 And the "backlog shows no signs of abating as the
number of incoming appeals continues to surpass the adjudication
capacity at Levels 3 and 4."10 As of September 1, 2017, nearly 600,000
01
appeals are pending at OMHAo
and OMHA only has capacity to hear

97.

AM. Hosp. ASS'N, supra note 57, at 2; see GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 94, at 15.

98.

See Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 15.

99.

Christopher Cheney, RAC Reforms Leave Providers Skeptical, MEDPAGE
TODAY

(Jan.

19,

2015),

https://www.medpagetoday.com/public

healthpolicy/medicare/49612.
100. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3.
101. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement,
Medicare Advantage
Organization Determination, and Medicare
Prescription Drug Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 81 Fed.
Reg. 43,790, 43,792 (July 5, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 401,
405, 422).
102. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 20.
103. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 7.
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id.

at 41,

at

7;

OFFICE OF MEDICARE

JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES

HEARINGS

& APPEALS,

FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

FISCAL YEAR 2016 6 (2015).
106. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.

285

HEALTH MATRIX - VOLUME 28 - ISSUE 1 - 2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

77,000 appeals per year.107 By 2021, the government expects that there
will be nearly one million pending appeals before OMHA, even taking
into account all of the agency's efforts to reduce the backlog.108 OMHA
currently resolves appeals within an average of three years 1 -already
eleven times longer than permitted but "some already-filed claims
could take a decade or more to resolve." 110
Despite this enormous wait to receive an ALJ hearing, providers
find ALJ review to be the most important of the System's four steps.
According to the Government Accountability Office, providers succeed
at overturning challenged denials more than half of the time.' In 2014,
for instance, ALJs fully reversed overpayment determinations in fiftyfour percent of appeals. 112 In previous years, ALJ reversal rates were
over sixty percent. 113 And certain providers are historically even more
successful before ALJ.114 Two factors, explored in more depth below,
explain the high reversal rate: ALJ review is the first time providers (1)
receive an evidentiary hearing and (2) are heard before truly neutral
arbiter.
Even though an ALJ is more likely than not to find that an alleged
overpayment was valid, CMS still recoups and withholds those
payments from providers while they wait years for an ALJ hearing.115
Though the government must repay the erroneously recouped payment
if the provider prevails, this is of little benefit to providers whose
businesses cannot survive the years-long wait."

107. Medicare Program Changes, 81 Fed. Reg. at 43, 792.
108. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-

JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
109.

Workload Information and Statistics Average Processing Time by Fiscal
Year, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 24, 2017),
www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/omha/about/current-workload/averageprocessing-time-by-fiscal-year/index.html; see also Am. Hosp. Ass'n v.
Price, 867 F.3d. at 171 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J. dissenting).

110. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 867 F.3d at 163; see also Am. Health Ass'n v. Burwell,
812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("These figures suggest that at current
rates, some already-filed claims could take a decade or more to resolve.");
see also MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.
111. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 20.
112. Id.

113. Id. at 69.
114. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
("[T]he American Hospital Association[] reported that they had appealed
52% of RAC denials, and that 66% of these appeals were successful.").
115. Press Release, supra note 52.
116. Press Release, supra note 52.
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Small healthcare providers, which have less liquidity and tolerance
for missing revenue, have been the most notable victims of this
process.117 The American Orthotic Prosthetic Association has stated
that "small health care providers like orthotic and prosthetic firms have
been 'unable to deal with being bombarded by the uncertainty resulting
from long-delayed [RAC] appeals for disputed Medicare payments."' 11
The Association highlighted that the pressure from the appeals backlog
have forced over one hundred small health care businesses "to close
their doors" and that "many more are in danger of being shuttered.""'
Larger providers, like hospital chains, can weather these delays and do
not face the same threat. 120 But regardless of their size, all providers
argue that the System's delays harm patients because their money is
tied up in appeals when it could be used for patient care. 121
The statute offers providers one recourse for the delays: escalation.
Escalation allows providers to proceed to the next stage of the appeal
when the agency exceeded its deadline in the previous stage. 122 So if it
takes longer than ninety days to receive an ALJ hearing, providers are
statutorily entitled to skip the ALJ hearing and move to DAB review. 123
This remedy, however, requires a big sacrifice. First, the DAB is only
required to provide an evidentiary hearing if an "extraordinary
question" is at issue; therefore, escalating beyond an ALJ requires most

117. Press Release, supra note 52; Jessica L. Gustafson and Abby Pendleton,
Medicare Appeals Adjudication Delays: Implications For Healthcare
Providers And Suppliers, 26 No. 5 HEALTH L.. 26, 28 (2014) [hereinafter
Gustafson and Pendleton] ("Of particular importance, the delay in
appeals adjudication results in significant cash flow issues for appellants.
These cash flow interruptions can be particularly troublesome for smaller
providers and suppliers faced with significant overpayment demands
resulting from post-payment audits.").
118. Press Release, supra note 52.

119. Id.
120. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at
5104.
121. See e.g., Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-

cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38 ("Because of the
consequent financial burden, some providers are 'forced . . . to reduce
costs, eliminate jobs, forgo services, and substantially scale back,' all of
which affects the quality and quantity of patient care."); D&G Holdings,

LLC v. Burwell, 156 F.Supp. 3d 798, 815 (W.D. La. Jan. 12, 2016); see
Hospice Savannah v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D.
Ga. Sept. 21, 2015).

&

122. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, Reimbursement 6 Exclusion, SHARP
COBOS http://sharpcobos.com/expertise/medicare-and-medicaid-reimbu
rsement/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
123. 42 U.S.C.
note 94.

§

1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii)

(2010); Adjudication Timeframes, supra
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providers to forfeit their only opportunity for an evidentiary hearing by
a neutral arbiter. 124 Second, the fourth level of appeal, DAB review, is
equally backlogged and thus escalation from the ALJ only lands
providers into another long queue. 125 Finally, escalating beyond both
the ALJ and the DAB-straight into federal court-creates a different
problem. Federal courts will generally give deference to the last agency
determination on the record, which invariably found for the government. 126
As a result, escalation as a remedy would deprive most providers their
best chance to overturn the government's overpayment determination. 127
The Medicare Appeals System no longer functions as it was
designed. It cannot accommodate the number of appeals entering it,
and providers are paying the consequences for the government's
bureaucratic failure. Delays deprive providers of access to their money
while they wait for an ALJ hearing-a hearing that is more likely than
not to prove that the money was wrongfully deprived. In the meantime,
small providers in particular suffer serious financial consequences,
facing insolvency as their money is temporarily deprived. And any
administrative remedy available to them comes with serious sacrifice.
But these harms extend beyond small providers. As explored in the
next section, the financial implications of the System's delays are passed
onto consumers in various ways.
III. IMPACT OF THE SYSTEM'S DELAYS ON CONSUMERS AND
THE BROADER HEALTHCARE SYSTEM

This Article has focused thus far on the consequences providers face
due to the System's delays. But the consequences exceed far beyond the
providers' experiences. These delays perpetuate systemic problems in
the healthcare market, which in turn affect the healthcare that patients
receive. In this section, I argue that the System's delays cause four
foreseeable effects: (1) the delays contribute to a consolidation of the
healthcare market as small healthcare providers face insolvency and
pressure to sell their practices to larger providers; (2) the regulatory
burdens perpetuate providers' frustration with Medicare, which could
cause more providers to opt out of Medicare; (3) the lack of access to
funds causes providers to cut patient services to accommodate shortterm resource constraints; and (4) the increased scrutiny resulting from
post-payment review may influence providers to make conservative
treatment decisions.

124. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
125. Id. at 186.
126. Id. at 191.

127. Id.
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First, small healthcare providers are disproportionately impacted
by the financial hardships the System's delays cause. 128 Large providers,
like hospital chains, can spread risk across numerous institutions-if a
company owns one hundred hospitals with a $100 million combined
operathig budget, its operations will not be heavily affected if one
hospital's post-payment review ties up $5 million in the System. 129 It
simply has enough liquidity to endure the delay in getting a portion of
that money back after the ALJ determination. Small providers, on the
other hand, can face bankruptcy because of one or two bad audits. 13 0 If
an orthotic manufacturer with a $2 million operating budget is audited,
and $400,000 of its revenue gets tied up in appeals, then it will struggle
to conthiue bushiess as usual as it waits.13 1 This threat hicreases
pressure on small providers to consolidate with larger chains to compete
in the market.132 And if the small bushiesses fold entirely, competition
in the healthcare market also decreases. Furthermore, if small providers
are forced to close their bushiesses in rural or underserved areas, then
large providers may not fill in those gaps, caushig those locations to
become healthcare deserts.

128. Press Release, supra note 52; Gustafson and Pendleton, supra note 117
("Of particular importance, the delay in appeals adjudication results in
significant cash flow issues for appellants . . . These cash flow
interruptions can be particularly troublesome for smaller providers and
suppliers faced with significant overpayment demands resulting from postpayment audits.").
129.

See

e.g.,

NICOLE V.

CRAIN

&

W.

MARK

CRAIN,

THE IMPACT OF

REGULATORY COSTS OF SMALL FIRMS 8 (2010),
available at:
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of20Regula
tory%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full).pdf ("Considering all
federal regulations . .. [compliance c]osts per employee thus appear to be
at least 36 percent higher in small firms than in medium-sized and large
firms . . . . This is the familiar empirical phenomenon known as economies
of scale, and its impact is to provide a comparative cost advantage to
large firms over small firms.").
130. See DUG Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 815; see Hospice Savannah v.

Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015);
CTR FOR MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID SERVICES,

PROGRAM HISTORY AND

AUTHORITIES,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Monitoring-Programs/recovery-audit-program-parts-c-andd/Program-History-and-Authorities.html (last updated May 12, 2017).
131. Jessica L. Gustafson & Abby Pendleton, supra note 117.
132. See Statement, Paul B. Ginsburg, Professor and Director of Public Safety,
University of Southern California, Health Care Market Consolidations:
Impacts on
Costs,
Quality
and
Access
(March
16,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GinsburgCalifornia-Senate-Health-Mar-16-1.pdf.
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Recent consolidation of the healthcare market is a well-documented
problem.13 3 Hospital chains are buying up smaller hospitals, insurance
companies are merging, and service providers are joining forces.13 4 As of
2012, two dialysis companies owned over seventy percent of the national
market.13 5 This consolidation negatively impacts consumers because
competition disappears, driving up prices, while innovation and patient
choice falls.13 6 National healthcare costs are risig, in part, because of
this market contraction:
Rising health care costs are a matter of national alarm, and
increasing attention has been paid to the growing market power
accumulated by health care providers .

. .

. Moreover, much of

the recent rise in health care costs is directly attributable to
increases in supply-side market power that are products of hospital
consolidations and the growth of provider collaborations.137
Even more concerning is the fact that large healthcare providers
have signaled their intention to use the savings from the 2017 tax
reform law to consolidate the market further.1 3 8
The healthcare market has constricted in recent years for a variety
of reasons unrelated to the System.1 39 But the System's delays add

133. See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium: The New Health Care Industry
Consolidation, Integration, Competition In The Wake Of The ACA,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2016/02/24/symposium-the-new-health-care-industry-consolidationintegration-competition-in-the-wake-of-the-aca/; Paul Ginsburg, Health
care market consolidations: Impacts on costs, quality and access,
BROOKINGS INSTT. (March 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
testimonies/health-care-market-consolidations-impacts-on-costs-qualityand- access/.
134. Id.
135.

Two Thriving Dialysis Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/29/us/two-thrivingdialysis-companies.html? r= 1&.

136. See Ginsburg, supra note 134.
137. Barak D. Richman, Antitrust And Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return
To Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 125 (2007).
138. See Caroline Humer and Carl O'Donnell, U.S. Pharma Executives Expect
Deals to Pick Up After Tax Overhaul, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-conference-deals/u-spharma-executives-expect-deals-to-pick-up-after-tax-overhaulidUSKBN1EY28E?wpisrc=nlhealth202&wpmm=1;
Bob
Herman,
Health Care Companies Are Thrilled About The Tax Overhaul, AXIOS
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.axios.com/health-care-companies-are-

thrilled-about-the-tax-ov-1515474626-1dfb8877-d64d-4d3e-a90b3ac8782a62f0.html?wpisrc=nlhealth202&wpmm=1.
139. Gluck, supra note 133; see Ginsburg, supra note 134.
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another source of pressure to consolidate. If a small provider faces
insolvency as it waits for an ALJ determination, an easy solution is to
sell its business to a larger provider who may be looking to increase its
market share in a particular region or over a new product. 1 0 In this
way, small providers fall victims to a regulatory system that favors
larger businesses that can withstand near-term financial loss. This is
not the only instance where the government has been accused of
incentivizing consolidation to consumers' detriment.11
Second, the System's delays may also increase the tendency for
small providers to opt out of Medicare. 14 2 Many providers view the
backlog as another instance of regulatory burden and providers have
started to opt out of Medicare at higher rates.14 3 Though the
government need not disclose the percentage of doctors that refuse to
cover Medicare patients,1 4 some data exists for earlier years. From
2009-2012, the number of physicians that opted out of Medicare more
than doubled." Twenty-eight percent of family doctors have stopped
accepting new Medicare patients. 6 Providers reported that Medicare's

140. See Bakerlostetler, Healthcare Providers Face Increasing Financial
Pressure and Bankruptcy Risk, JDSUPRA.COM (June 13, 2014),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/healthcare-providers-faceincreasing-fin-70502/.
141. The Affordable Care Act incentivized providers to form Accountable Care
Organizations ("ACOs")
despite their many benefits, ACOs have been
criticized for creating pressure to consolidate. Jenny Gold, Accountable
Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/
("Many
health care economists fear that the race to form ACOs could have a
significant downside: hospital mergers and provider consolidation.");
Christopher Pope, How the Affordable Care Act Fuels Health Care Market
Consolidation, HERITAGE FOUND.

(Aug.

1,

2014),

https://www.herita

ge. org/health-care-reform/report/how-the-affordable-care-act-fuelshealth-care-market-consolidation. But see Hannah T. Neprash, Michael E.
Chernew, & J. Michael McWilliams, Little Evidence Exists To Support
The Expectation That Providers Would Consolidate To Enter New
Payment Models, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 346 (2017).
142. See Virgil Dickson, Fewer Doctors are Opting Out of Medicare,
MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM
(Jan.
30,
2018),
http://www.moder

nhealthcare.com/article/20180130/NEWS/180139995
143. Id.
144. Andrew Flowers, We May Finally Learn How Many Doctors are Opting
Out

of

Medicare,

FIVETHIRTYEIGHT,

(March

26,

2015),

http://f

ivethirtyeight.com/datalab/data-transparency-gets-a-win-in-housesmedicare-bill/.
145. See id.
146. Primary Care Physicians Accepting Medicare: A Snapshot, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND.

(2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/data-note-prima
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lower reimbursement rate and administrative burdens largely created
this phenomenon.4 7
It is typically the small-and in-demand-physician practice groups
that can disengage from the Medicare program; if a provider is popular
enough to operate at full capacity without any Medicare patients, it
might choose to avoid the hassle." The larger the provider, the more
dependent they are on Medicare patients to generate patient base, and
certain providers, like hospitals, could never opt out of Medicare."' The
Medicaid program has faced this problem to a much greater degree for
decades. The result: many Medicaid patients struggle to find doctors
that will treat them. 5 0 Not only does this raise questions about
accessibility, but also equality of care. When the most in-demand
physicians refuse Medicare patients, older populations may struggle to
access the best healthcare."'
Third, the System delays cause providers to cut services, fire
employees, and delay projects while waiting for the ALJ to return
portions of the collected overpayment. 15 2 The short-term deprivation of
needed funds impacts even those providers that can better manage the
ry-care-physicians-accepting-medicare-a-snapshot.
shot]; Melinda Beck, supra note 15.

[hereinafter A

Snap-

147. See Alan Tice, Access to Care: The Physician's Perspective, 70 HAWAII
MED J. 2011, 33 38. ("One respondent indicated in the survey that they
were 'not planning to accept any more new Medicare patients due to
numerous problems with reimbursement . . . it actually costs me to see
Medicare patients when extra administrative costs are factored in."').
148. See A Snapshot, supra note 146 ("About two-thirds (67 percent) of
primary care physicians age 55 or older say they accept new Medicare
patients compared with about three-quarters (76 percent) of primary care
physicians under age 55 (Figure 3). Younger doctors may be more likely
to be building their patient caseloads and, therefore, may be more willing
to take new patients.").
149. For instance, federal law requires hospitals to treat all individuals in need
of urgent care, and as a result, it wouldn't make any sense for hospitals
to not accept the insurance of a patient they are required to treat.
Emergency Medical Treatment 6 Labor Act (EMTALA), CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EMTALA/ (last visited April 1, 2018).
150. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Payments and Access to Care, 371 N ENG. J.
MED. 2345 (2014); Brigid Goody, Medicare Dependent Hospitals: Who
Depends on Whom?, 14 HEALTH CARE FINAC. REV. 97, *4 (1992).
151. See Jeffrey P. Harrison & Rachel M. Barksdale, The Impact of RAC
Audits on US Hospitals, 39 J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE 1, 8 (2013); See
AM. HOSPITAL AsS'N FACTS, supra note 57.
152. See Statement from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n,
Statement on Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013 (Mar. 19, 2013),
https://www.aha.org/system/files/presscenter/pressrel/2013/130319-prrac.pdf.
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financial hardship associated with the backlogs.15 3 Providers of all kinds
are forced to make sacrifices-often at the expense of patients and
employees-to offset the setback.' For example, Baxter Regional
Medical Center claimed that it had so much money tied up in the
appeals process in 2012 that it could not "afford to replace a failing roof
over its surgery department, purchase new beds for its Itensive Care
Unit, engage in other basic upkeep, or purchase other necessary capital
items."' Other facilities claim that they are forced to turn away
patients, cut needed services, and eliminate jobs to endure the shortterm loss.15 6 While some large providers may be making these cuts to
avoid a reduction in their profit margins, small providers may have no
other choice.
Finally, on a long-term basis, the post-payment review process in
general may cause providers to become increasingly conservative in
treatment decisions. To avoid retrospective recoupment of Medicare
payments, providers may error on the side of nonintervention for
Medicare patients to avoid the hassle of having to appeal the
government's determination that the treatment was not medically
necessary. 1 7 Nonintervention can harm patients when necessary care is
delayed or avoided.' Providers, of course, face many incentives that
pull them in different directions. For example, medical malpractice risk
and reimbursement schemes can incentivize providers to both over or
undertreat patients.1 9 Overtreatment is similarly problematic because
it can expose patients to unnecessary risks and lead to overspending.160
Though physicians are not immune to hicentives, professional
obligations ethically require them to act in a patient's best interest at
all times, which tempers this general concern. 16 1 It is unclear whether
153. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1, at v-vi.
154. Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037,

69,039 (Nov. 10, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 455).
155. Complaint at 5, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C.
2014) (No. 14 Civ. 851).
156. Id. at 17; Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-

cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
157. 4 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,038. (Nov. 10, 2010).
158.

See

RACs: STRATEGIES

TO REDUCE YOUR RISK

AND

SUCCESSFULLY

APPEAL PAYMENT DENIALS 1, 33 (Erin Trompeter ed., 2010).
159. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law,

82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2015).
160. See Chanapa Tantibanchachai, In Survey, Doctors Say Unneeded Medical
Care Is Common, Driven by Fear of Malpractice, HUB (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://hub.jhu.edu/2017/09/06/unneeded-medical-care-hopkinssurvey/.
161.

AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, ACP ETHICS MANUAL SIXTH EDITION (2012),

available at: https://www.acponline.org/clinical-information/ethics-and-
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bureaucratic inefficiencies associated with post-payment reviews would
impact providers' decision making, but it's important to be aware of
the possible risk.
The negative, systemic effects of the System's delays are caused
largely by the financial strain small providers face: patients pay more
when small providers leave the healthcare market, have fewer choices
when small providers opt out of Medicare, and receive worse healthcare
when small providers cannot afford to maintain the facilities and
services provided to patients. This is important because the healthcare
market still includes many small providers. According to CMS, "most
providers and suppliers are small entities, either by nonprofit status or
by having revenues of less than $7.5 million to $38.5 million in any one
year."1 6 2 To the extent that the System's delays disproportionately
burden small providers-and that burden negatively impacts the price
and quality of healthcare-it is important to find a remedy that aids
small providers.
IV. FAILED REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
CMS is aware of the delays associated with the System and, after
public pressure gathered, attempted to ease the backlog through various
mechanisms. Settlement has been the agency's most successful tactic
thus far. In 2015, the agency settled roughly 300,000 inpatient-hospital
claims that waited for ALJ review. 16 3 The agency accomplished this
mass settlement by offering to settle all pending inpatient hospital
claims if the appellants would agree to pay 68 percent of the overpayment's value at issue in the appeal.' This was a popular solution:
the government was able to quickly and easily reduce the number of
appeals clogging the System and providers were able to make an
informed business decision about whether to continue waiting for the

professionalism/acp-ethics-manual-sixthedition-a-comprehensivemedical-ethics-resource/acp-ethics-manual-sixth-edition.
162. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement,
Medicare Advantage Organization
Determination, and Medicare
Prescription Drug Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 82 Fed.
Reg. 4974, 5105 (proposed Jan. 17, 2017).
163. Memorandum Opinion at 11-13, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-

cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
164. See Inpatient Hospital Reviews,
CMS, http://cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFSCompliance-Programs/Medical-Review/InpatientHospitalReviews.html
(last updated June 6, 2016) [hereinafter CMS, Inpatient Hospital
Reviews]; see Reed Abelson, Medicare Will Settle Short-Term Care Bills,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/
business/medicare-will-settle-appeals-of-short-term-care-

bills.html? r=0.

294

HEALTH MATRIX - VOLUME 28 - ISSUE 1 - 2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

ALJ or accept the deal. In 2016, CMS announced that it would continue
the settlement program and settled additional claims. 6
Though settlement on this scale greatly reduced-in the shortterm-the appeals backlog, there are three criticisms of this program.
First, the program has no effect on the pipeline of appeals entering the
System or the System's capacity to hear appeals; as a result, its impact
is temporary.16 6 Second, the program was only offered to certain kinds
of hospitals and hospital chains; therefore, it excluded many providers,
including small providers like physician practice groups, home healthcare agencies, and hospices."' Third, the structure of the settlement
offer creates bad hicentives. The less confident an appellant is in the
strength of its appeal, the more likely it would be to settle. On the other
hand, appellants who believed they were likely to whi on appeal-and
could withstand the wait-were more likely to reject the offer. As a
result, more frivolous claims were settled and CMS may have lost
money in the long run by forfeiting portions of valid overpayments.
Finally, as explored below, the more desperate the provider is, the more
likely it will be to settle with the agency regardless of the strength of
its appeal. Large providers can therefore choose to wait if they think
they will win before an ALJ, but the more vulnerable small providers
will often be forced hito settlement.
In addition to settlement, CMS also attempted to improve the
backlog through rulemaking. CMS's rule (the "Rule"), which became
effective March 20, 2017, aimed to streamline the appeals process so
that its fixed budget could resolve more appeals.' The Rule was issued
as one prong of a three-pronged approach that, if implemented in its
entirety, could eliminate the backlog by 2021.169 The agency, however,
lacks control over the two other prongs: additional funding and
legislative reforms. Both require congressional action. 170 The agency can
165. See CMS, Inpatient Hospital Reviews, supra note 169.
166. See e.g., Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 38 n.64
("Although the global settlement significantly reduced the backlog, it
ended in 2015, and therefore, will not have an effect on the current
backlog.").
167. See Amy Kearbey & Nicholas Alarif, CMS Announces New Settlement
Initiative Addressing Medicare Appeals Backlog, Enhancing Provider
Appeal
Options,
MCDERMOTTWILL&EMERY
(Jan.
25,
2018),
https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2018/01/cm
s-announces-new-settlement-initiative.
168. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5104.
169. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 10.
170. Medicare Program Changes 81 Fed. Reg. 43, 792 (emphasis added) ("(1)
request new resources to invest at all levels of appeal to increase
adjudication capacity and implement new strategies to alleviate the
current backlog; (2) take administrative actions to reduce the number of
pending appeals and implement new strategies to alleviate the current
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only create regulations aimed to streamline the System so that it
becomes more efficient, which is exactly what the Rule aims to do."'
The agency acknowledges that "this final rule makes only minimal
changes to the existing appeals procedures" and therefore "[it] would
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities.172
The Rule's most significant modifications to the System include
replacing ALJs with attorney adjudicators in certain circumstances.1 3
OMHA will employ and train these attorney adjudicators."' Their
decisions would carry the same weight as ALJs, but they could rule
only on issues that do not require an evidentiary hearing.1 5 This reform,
though creative, is unlikely to seriously curb the problem. By the
agency's own estimates, this proposal would only redirect roughly
24,500 appeals per year from ALJs to attorney adjudicators.17 6 The
600,000 pending appeals heavily overshadow that number.177 Further,
this proposal will incur additional costs as OMHA will need to employ
and compensate these attorney adjudicators, so removing the 24,500
appeals per year will cost additional money.
Another of the agency's reforms will give the DAB precedential
authority.178 Unlike the current system where ALJs and the DAB
must look at every appeal in a vacuum-the finalized proposal allows
decision-makers to build on previous decisions.179 Precedential DAB
backlog; and (3) propose legislative reforms that provide additional
funding and new authorities to address the volume of appeals.").
171. The Rule purports to "address the Medicare appeals backlog and create
efficiencies at the ALJ level of appeal by allowing OMHA to reassign a
portion of workload to non-ALJ adjudicators and reduce procedural
ambiguities that result in unproductive efforts at OMHA and unnecessary
appeals to the Medicare Appeals Council." Medicare Program: Changes
to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5104.

172. Id. at 5,105.
173. Id. at 4,981-82.
174. Id. at 4,983.
175. Id. at 4,982 (" [A]ttorney adjudicators [can] issue decisions when a decision
can be issued without an ALJ conducting a hearing under the regulations,
to dismiss appeals when an appellant withdraws his or her request for an
ALJ hearing, and to remand appeals for information that can only be
provided by CMS or its contractors or at the direction of the Council, as
well as to conduct reviews of QIC and IRE dismissals.").

176. Id. at 5,104.
177. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-

JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
178. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at
4,977.
179. See id.
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decisions would be published in the federal register and would be
binding on the first three levels of the System. 1s0 An important
advantage of this reform is that providers and Medicare contractors
would receive better notice of the agency's hiterpretation of its laws
such that they could better predict decisions and conform their conduct
to the rules." Though the hope is that this proposal would reduce
adjudicators' time and effort, the Rule provides no estimate for the
impact of precedential decisions. 18 2 This proposal is unlikely to seriously
combat the severity of the appeals backlog, especially in the short term.
The agency will also limit the instances in which providers can
submit new evidence in an ALJ hearing. 18 3 If the provider did not
submit a piece of evidence at the Reconsideration stage, the provider
must show good cause for this omission or the evidence will be excluded
at later stages.' This proposal could be detrimental to providers that
may not be able to gather all of the necessary evidence within the
timeframe for a Reconsideration submission. 1 5 And the government
provides no estimate for how this suggestion would reduce the appeals
backlog."' Though CMS also proposed other administrative tweaks to
the System, none of them were associated with a measurable reduction
87
in the appeals backlog.'
CMS estimated that its Rule would remove fewer than 30,000
appeals per year from the System.188 This is a disappointing figureand one that would only have prospective impact without affecting the
current backlog of appeals. As a result, the proposed rule alonewithout corresponding budget and legislative changes-will be
insufficient. As of September 1, 2017, the agency admitted that, even
presuming all of its regulatory and settlement proposals are fully
implemented, and considering all changes the agency has made in the

180. Id.
181. See Constance B. Tobias, DAB Chair Implementing Medicare Appeals
Precedent Rule, Welcomes Suggestions, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV. (Oct. 27 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/blog/2017/10/27/medicareappeals-precedent-rule.html.
182. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at

5,104-05.
183. Id. at 5,043.
184. See id. at 5,045.
185. MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47, at 5.
186. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 5,104-5.
187. See id.
188. Id.
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past few years to combat the problem,' the backlog will still grow
every year between FY2017 and FY2021. The current estimate is that

the appeals backlog will grow to 972,591 by FY2021 (almost 300,000
more than today).1 0 The agency's solutions are failing, and it is impossible for the agency to maintain the status quo without legislative
intervention. Recognizing the limitations of regulatory solutions, the
agency has suggested two legislative proposals that it believes could
solve the problem.
The agency's first legislative proposal was to increase OMHA's
budget. The agency requested a 2017 budget increase of roughly $270
million dollars for the office responsible for the ALJ and DAB appeals.9
This budget would have required Congress to more than double the
current funding at a time when budgets are strapped. 19 2 As expected,
Congress did not grant this request, and OMHA's budget for 2017
stayed stable at $107 million. 19 3 Congress also refused to grant the
agency's request for a funding increase in 2015 and 2016.14 The agency
recently renewed its request for a substantial budgetary increase, which
the President's budget endorsed, but there is little evidence that

Congress will adopt

it.

95

Under the second legislative proposal, the agency suggested that
Congress institute legislative reforms to reduce the number of appeals
needing review.196 The agency's suggested legislative fix would include
a provision to shift the cost of ALJ and DAB appeals onto the recovery
auditors themselves. That is, part of the contingency fee gathered from
RACs would pay for the cost of appeals.' 7 This proposal would temper
189. For a good summary of the changes the agency has already adopted to
curb the appeals crisis, see Memorandum Opinion at 11-13, Am. Hosp.

Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF
No. 38.
190. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-

JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
191. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3.
192. Id. at 8.

193. HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief-OMHA, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/abou
t/budget/fy2018/budget-in-brief/omha/index.html#ftnol
May 23, 2017) [hereinafter HHS FY 2018 Budget].

(last updated

194. Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-

JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
195. HHS FY 2018 Budget, supra note 193; Def. Status Report at 2, Am.
Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017),

ECF No. 58.
196.

U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE

APPEALS PROCESS, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/dab/medicar
e-appeals-backlog.pdf (last visited March 25, 2018).
197. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 9.
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the effect of the conthigency-fee arrangement: if RACs paid for the
additional appeals their audits cause, they might be more likely to avoid
controversial overpayment determinations. This suggestion, however,
has never been picked up in any proposed legislation.
Instead, in 2015, Congress proposed the Audit & Appeal Fairness,
Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act (the "AFIRM Act"), which
hicorporates different legislative recommendations." It is no longer
active,"
but when the bill was hitroduced, it contahied more
controversial reforms, such as increasing the amount-in-controversy
requirement for an ALJ hearing from $150 to $1,500-and allowing
ALJs to render decisions without an evidentiary hearing in certain
cases. 200 The AFIRM Act did not recommend any substantive changes
to the RAP program, a fact that frustrated providers. 201 It did, however,
propose to increase OMHA's budget and track the RAP reversal rates
to maintain better quality control over the program. 202
Despite Congress's awareness of the growing problem, the AFIRM
Act sat unattended for over a year. In September 2016, D.C. District
Court discussed the AFIRM Act's stagnancy in Congress as it reviewed
a legal challenge to System's delays:
[I]t has been 21 months since the AFIRM Act was reported by
the Senate Finance Committee to the full Senate on December 8,
2015. No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary
offers no evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that
the bill has support in the House of Representatives, or that the
President would sign it.203
The court concluded that "Congress is unlikely to play the role of
the cavalry here, riding to the rescue of the Secretary's besieged
program." 204 Two other bills modifying the RAP were introduced in
205
2012 and 2013 and similarly never made it out of committee.

198. Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of
2015, S. 2368, 114th Cong. (2015).

199. Id,
200. Id.
201. Id.

202. Id
203. Memorandum Opinion at 15, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-

00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
204. Id. at 16.
205. Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6575, 112th Cong. (2012);
Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 1250, 113th Cong. (2013).
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On May 23, 2017, the President released his FY2018 President's
Budget. 206 It icluded a series of legislative proposals to curb the appeals
backlog. 207 First, it proposed to remand appeals back to the Redetermination stage if the appellant introduces new evidence. 208 Second, like
the AFIRM Act, it proposed to increase the amount-in-controversy
requirement to $1,560, with annual increases. 209 Third, it proposed to
establish magistrate adjudication. 210 And finally, it proposed to expedite
claims that lack material factual disputes. 211 The agency estimated that
if Congress adopted all of these proposals, the backlog would shrink to
353,603 appeals by FY2021 (compared to the nearly one million
pending appeals by FY2021 without them). 212 Nevertheless, there has
been 11o indication from Congress that it intends to act on this issue
and given the current state of Congressional gridlock, it is unlikely that
Congress will step in to fix the problem at any point in the near future.
The agency, acting in a vacuum, is largely powerless to solve the
ultimate problem. It cannot increase its budget to process more appeals
per year or reform the current programs responsible for the increasing
number of appeals entering the System. It is therefore unsurprising that
CMS's attempted solutions-mass settlements and rulemaking have
been largely ineffective to cause any real change.
But even if the agency cannot solve the underlying issues that
created the backlog, it can improve the financial stress providers' face
while they wait. 213 For instance, the agency could delay its recoupment
until after the ALJ determination. The Social Security Act prevents
CMS from recouping overpayments before Reconsideration decisions. 214
206. Dec. of Jennifer Moughalian at 4, Am. Hosp. Ass'n. v. Price, No. 14-cv-

00851 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2017)
207. Id.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 5-6.
212. Id. at 6.
213. Some regulatory solutions have been proposed in articles that were
published before or without consideration of providers' recent legal
victories. Kinney, supra note 47, at 133 (suggesting an "inquisitorial
system" that would allow providers and their counsel to interact directly
with reviewers); Michelle Ellis, The Medicare Appeals Crisis: Why
Mediation Is The Medicine, 16 PEPP. DIsp. RESOL. L.J. 61 (2016)
(supporting mediation to relieve the backlog); Mary Squire, RAC: A
Program In Distress, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 219, 253-54 (2015) (proposing
various reforms); Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 79, 108 (2017) (arguing that HHS should focus on
providing full process to certain non-corporate appellants should).
214. 42 U.S.C.§1395ddd(f)(2)

(2010).
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CMS, however, has discretion to delay recoupment beyond
Reconsideration without violating the Act. Through rulemaking, it
could modify its own guidance to delay recoupment. 215 This reform
could make a big difference because, as discussed above, small providers
are disproportionately impacted by the financial strain associated with
the delays. As a result, this change would particularly help small
businesses endure the wait times and mitigate the broader consequences
on the healthcare market discussed in Section III. It would also reduce
the administrative cost associated with money changing hands three
times, instead of twice.
Delaying recoupment by rulemaking would not cure the problemat some point, Congress must dramatically change either the pipeline
of appeals or the capacity of OMHA to hear them but it would
alleviate the harshest symptoms of this problem until legislation passed.
In fact, some small providers have sued the agency, arguing that it
should be prohibited from collecting overpayments until after the ALJ
hearing, discussed in depth below. CMS, however, has heavily resisted
any effort to postpone recoupment, claiming that it would "upset the
careful balance of interests accomplished through the present
construction of the Medicare statute and regulations." 216 But the
government has not explained or substantiated why delaying recoupment would financially harm the agency. 217 And the evidence might
suggest otherwise: CMS has lost as much as $17.8 million i interest
payments to Medicare providers between 2010 and 2015 because it
recouped overpayments that ultimately needed to be returned to
providers with interest. 218 Of the $17.8 million, CMS paid $13 million
219
to providers in 2014 and 2015 when the delays were the longest.

215. See LIMITATION
ON RECOUPMENT,
OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

supra

note

87;

MEDICARE

216. Reply Memorandum In Opposition To Preliminary Injunction at 8, DUG
Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d. at 798.
217. Id. In another matter, the government did claim that delayed recoupment
would have "disastrous" financial implications for the Medicare Trust
funds because "CMS collects an average of $153 million in principal and
$15 million in interest a year after the second level of appeal." Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgement at 13, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 812 F.3d.183.
However, delaying recoupment would not take away this revenue source,
but postpone it. The government failed to give any account for why the
government would be significantly harmed by the delay i.e., why it needs
this money in the short term. Id.
218. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 21.
219. Id.
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CMS has also objected to delaying recoupment because it would
increase, rather than decrease, the backlog. 220 The idea is that appellants are more likely to appeal to an ALJ and endure the wait times if
they are not financially burdened while they wait. 221 But this objection
misses the mark. Providers are always incentivized to appeal their
claims because the alternative is to pay back the full amount immediately. 222 Regardless of whether they appeal, CMS will recoup payments,
so the practice is to appeal everything in the hopes that some of the
recoupment will be repaid. Indeed, the government frequently laments
that providers appeal every claim regardless of its merit. 223 Because
providers are already incentivized to appeal every claim despite
financial burden, delaying recoupment will not have the impact the
government claims.
CMS may dislike the idea of delayed recoupment for a more
nefarious reason: CMS can use time as a weapon once providers start
to feel financial pressure. For example, CMS can negotiate harsh
settlements with providers or wait for companies to file for bankruptcy,
never able to appear before an ALJ. 224 Judge Henderson on the D.C.
Circuit recently worried about this possibility:
[B]argaining power is a two-way street. Subjecting the average
claimant to a waiting period more than eleven times longer than
the statute permits and thereby choking off cash flow for basic
operational needs unfairly weakens the claimant's position,
giving it every incentive to settle for only a fraction of what it
225
might win after years of litigation.

220. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement at 13, D & G Holding, 156

F. Supp. 3d. at 798.
221. Id.
222. Jacqueline Belliveau, Can Changes to Medicare Reimbursement Appeals
Reduce
Backlog?,
REVCYCLEINTELLIGENCE
(Aug
31,
2016),
https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/can-changes-to-medicarereimbursement-appeals-reduce-backlog.
223. See e.g., HHS PRIMER, supra note 84 (3), at 7 ("HHS is aware of two
elements of the existing appeals structure that appear to contribute to a
growing sense among some appellants and their representatives that
appealing every claim is a good business practice.").
224. Squire, supra note 213, at 247 ("CMS is fully aware of the financial
predicament that providers confront when a large portion of their revenue
faces the possibility of termination. The agency has nothing to lose by
dragging the proceedings on for years. Many providers may be willing to
settle claims for a smaller amount than initially demanded out of a fear
of losing their entire business as an alternative, even when they believe
the denials were made in error.").
225. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 172 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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CMS should consider delaying recoupment to ease the financial
burden on small providers-it is the only administrative remedy that
could mitigate the consequences of the System's collapse. And if it
refuses to correct this problem itself, courts might step in to demand
the same outcome.
Without real solutions on the horizon from either Congress or the
agency, providers have pursued creative ways to challenge the status
quo through federal litigation. Litigation of this sort is typically very
difficult because courts tend to dismiss unexhausted claims and defer
to agencies in the administration of their programs. But recently, courts
have been willhig to consider providers' challenges and question the
government's conduct. 226 The next section explores these lawsuits and
the impact proposed remedies might have on small providers in particular. It argues that the best legal remedy would be to force to agency
to delay recoupment, at least until Congress is able to legislate a longterm solution.

V.

THE PROMISE OF FEDERAL LITIGATION

Providers frustrated with the lack of regulatory and legislative
solutions have sued the agency in federal court. These lawsuits have
largely pursued two challenges. First, providers have brought challenges
in mandamus aimed at forcing compliance with the statutory
deadlines. 227 Second, providers have brought due process challenges
aimed at delaying recoupment until after providers have been afforded
an ALJ hearing. 228 The former would attempt to fix the delays without
altering the agency's timeline for recoupment; the latter would attempt
to postpone recoupment without altering the length of the delays. These
two strategies reflect the types of providers who filed the lawsuits. The
main plaintiff in the mandamus lawsuit was the American Hospital
Association ("AHA"), a powerful lobbying organization representing a
variety of facilities and hospital systems. 229 On the other hand, small
providers under threat of bankruptcy have typically sued under the Due
Process Clause. 23 0 AHA has the financial capacity to withstand years of
226. David Tolley and Greer Donley, A Favorable, New Climate for
Challenging Medicare Appeals, 27 MEDICARE REPORT (BNA) No. 737
(Aug. 12, 2016).
227. A writ of mandamus orders the government to comply with the law. See
Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 812 F.3d 183; see supra Sections V.A.
228. See D 6G Holding, 156 F.Supp. 3d at 798; see supra Sections V.B.
229. About the AHA, Am. HOSPITAL ASSN.,
index.shtml (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).

http://www.aha.org/about/

230. Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253-JRH-GRS, 2015 WL
8488432, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015); DUG Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d.

at 798.
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litigation as the D.C. District Court weighs the merits. But the small
provider plaintiffs have settled their lawsuits against the agency
quickly, even when the courts appeared sympathetic to their arguments
by awarding preliminary relief.231
On December 5, 2016, the D.C. District Court granted a writ of
mandamus to force the agency to comply with its statute requiring an
ALJ hearing within niety days. 23 2 The future of the writ is uncertain
after the D.C. Circuit recently questioned whether it was possible for
the government to comply with it. 233 But regardless, I argue below that
mandamus is not the proper remedy as it fails to protect small
providers, especially in the short-term. Istead, the writ may give large
providers unique leverage while negotiating with the agency,
perpetuating the disproportionate harm small providers experience. A
due process remedy, on the other hand, would protect small providers
by preventing the agency from recouping a provider's Medicare
payments before the provider has received an ALJ determination.
Removing this financial strain will help small providers avoid
bankruptcy, cut needed patient services, and resist the pressure to
consolidate with larger providers or opt out of Medicare-thus helping
healthcare consumers. This section explores the feasibility of a due
process challenge, including the significant legal and practical hurdles
providers must overcome to litigate the issue to finality.
A.

Litigation Seeking to Force Compliance with the 90-Day Timeframe

There are many possible mechanisms to challenge the System's
delays based on the agency's failure to abide by the statutory mandate,
including a writ of mandamus, ultra vires, or through the Administrative Procedures Act. Requesting a writ of mandamus-a strategy
AHA adopted in 2014-has been the most successful approach, though
its future is currently uncertain. The D.C. District Court hiitially
dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, but in May 2016, the D.C.
231. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH
(W.D. La. Apr. 26, 2016), ECF. 100; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc.

v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2015), ECF
No. 24.
232. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167291,

at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 5,
2016).
233. The district court is now reconsidering its decision after the D.C. Circuit
required it to determine whether it was possible for HHS to comply with
this remedy. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
On March 22, 2018, the district court stayed the case for three months
and ordered the plaintiff to submit specific proposals for a mandamus
order with which the government could possibly comply. Minute Order,
Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, No. :14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. March 22,

2018), ECF No. 81.
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Circuit reversed and remanded for a decision on the merits. 23 4 In a
strongly worded opinion, the Circuit found that it had jurisdiction and
that a writ was warranted if the legislature failed to fix problem itself:
Taking the above factors into account, the district court more
than a year after its first denial and with the problem only
worsening might find it appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus
ordering the Secretary to cure the systemic failure to comply with
the deadlines . . . . Given this, and given the unique
circumstances of this case, the clarity of the statutory duty likely
will require issuance of the writ if the political branches have
failed to make meaningful progress within a reasonable period of
time say, the close of the next full appropriations cycle. 235
This opinion came after the Fourth Circuit considered the same
issue months earlier and held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a mandamus
action. 23 6 The D.C. Circuit's decision revitalized providers that hoped
for a legal remedy to cure the System's delays.
As soon as the D.C. Circuit remanded AHA to the district court,
the agency moved to stay the litigation until September 2017 so that it
had more time to fix the problem itself.23 7 The district court refused to
grant the agency's stay 238 and eventually issued a writ of mandamus,
which ordered the agency to comply with its statutory obligation to
provide an ALJ hearing within ninety days. 239 The court recognized that
compliance could not be immediate, but nevertheless required the
agency to eliminate the backlog by 2021 with incremental reductions
each year-"i.e., 30% reduction from the current backlog of cases

pending at the ALJ level by December 31, 2017; 60% by December 31,
2018; 90% by December 31, 2019; and 100% by December 31, 2020."1240
In a surprising twist, the D.C. Circuit again reversed and remanded
to the district court, finding that it failed to consider whether it was
impossible for the agency to legally comply with the writ. 241 And
because the judiciary cannot order the government to do the impossible,

234. Id.
235. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d at 193.
236. Cumberland Co. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. Mar. 7,

2016).
237. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
238. Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-

JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
239. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167291, at *1.
240. Id. at *8.
241. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 160.
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the district court was required to first decide possibility. 24 2 The D.C.
Circuit raises an important question: how will the agency suddenly be
able to drain the backlog after attempting to do so for years with little
improvement? The answer: it will not. Judge Boasberg expressed this
sentiment in his September 2016 opinion: "the Court, however, does
not possess a magic wand that, when waved, will eliminate the backlog.
Plaintiffs' suggestion that the Court simply order HHS to resolve each
of the pending appeals by the statutorily prescribed deadlines is
extremely wishful thihkiig."243 But while a writ of mandamus cannot
suddenly fix the ALJ capacity problem, it pressures Congress to act
and the agency to shift priorities even more dramatically to
accommodate as many appeals as possible. After all, why should the
government's inability to fix its broken System burden providers
histead of the government?
Settlement would be the easiest-and perhaps the only way for
the agency to reduce the backlog and comply with the writ of
mandamus. Settlement will allow the agency to quickly reduce the
number of pending appeals without fundamentally altering the System's
procedures or the agency's recoupment timeline. The agency's mass
settlements have thus far been the only improvement that has made
any significant impact on the backlog. And in December 2016, CMS
decided to extend its mass settlement program. 244 As CMS conthiues to
feel the pressure to settle, providers may start to gain leverage against
the agency to negotiate highly favorable settlements and dismiss their
claims for a portion of the potential overpayment. 24 5 The agency argued
recently before the D.C. Circuit that settlement was its only option for
compliance with the writ, and that it might be forced to settle frivolous
246
claims at a significant loss.
If HHS pursues settlement to clear the backlog, it will likely
rehiforce the disparity among small and large providers. Large hospital
chains with many appeals pending in the System will have more
leverage with the agency looking to dismiss a large number of claims.
If they are not happy with the agency's offer, they can reject it knowhig
242. Id.
243. Memorandum Opinion at 15, Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-

00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
&

244. Hospital Appeals Settlement Process 2016, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Appeals-and- Grieva
nces/OrgMedFFSAppeals/Hospital-Appeals-Settlement-Process2016.html (last modified Jan. 17, 2017).
245. David Tolley and Greer Donley, Recent Developments in Litigation
Challenging the Medicare Appeals Delays: Is Victory Likely for Medicare
Providers?, 27 MEDICARE REPORT (BNA) No. 938 (Oct. 6, 2016).
246. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 167. The agency argued that it
would be illegal to require it to settle frivolous claims. Id.
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that they have the financial security to wait for their hearing. Small
providers appealing fewer claims will have less leverage to negotiate
favorable deals and feel more desperate to accept any offer that will
return some portion of their recouped payment. 24 7 As a result, small
providers can be pressured into unfavorable settlements, while large
providers can harness a writ of mandamus to their advantage.
The AHA-a powerful organization representing both large
corporate hospital chains as well as individual facilities-has the
financial capacity to litigate the issue fully. 248 The primary remedy
requested, compliance with the 90-day statute, was not aimed at serving
its most vulnerable members, but providing broad relief. As a result,
this remedy does not attempt to relieve small providers of the burdens
associated with waiting. And while it provides needed recourse to
correct the egregious delays, it cannot be the sole solution, at least not
in the short term before the backlog is fully emptied.
B.

Litigation Seeking to Delay Recoupment Until After the ALJ
Hearing

Some providers have pursued another litigation strategy:
challenging the agency's conduct under the Due Process Clause. Unlike
a mandamus challenge, which would attempt to compel the government
to act in accordance with its statutory mandate, a procedural due
process claim would ask a court to prevent the government from
recouping overpayments until after an ALJ determination. In short,
this challenge asks the court to find that recoupment before an ALJ
hearing unconstitutionally deprives providers of their property without
due process. It would not, however, impact the length of the delays,
only the burden associated with waiting. This litigation strategy would
be particularly helpful for small providers who could thereby avoid the
financial strain of erroneous recoupment. Though two small providers
have been successful at winning preliminary relief under this theory,
24 9
their cases settled before the merits could be litigated.
This section explores whether a due process challenge has merit and
the many legal and practical challenges that could prevent a due process
claim from being litigated to finality. If a provider could successfully
and fully litigate a due process challenge, however, it would force the
agency to do what it is refusing to do in its rulemaking: delay

247. Id.at 177 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (noting that a provider's financial
exigency unfairly weakens its bargaining power).
248. About the AHA, AM. Hosp. Ass'N., http://www.aha.org/about/ind
ex.shtml (last accessed Dec. 22, 2017).

249. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH
(W.D. La. Apr. 26, 2016); Order, see Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell,

No. 4:15-cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24.
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recoupment until after an ALJ hearing. Without this pressure, the
agency will likely continue to refuse this needed reform.
1.

Exploring the Merits of a Due Process Claim

The first step in any due process claim is to identify the liberty or
property interest at stake-only then is due process required. 25 0 After
demonstrating that a constitutionally protected property interest
exists, providers must prove the government deprived them of that
property interest without due process. To make this showing, plaintiffs
will need to demonstrate that the first two levels of the System provide
insufficient procedural protections to justify a deprivation of property.
This analysis generally involves a balancing of the government's burden
in providing additional process and the plaintiff's harm if the additional
process is denied.
To prove that a constitutionally protected interest is at stake,
plaintiffs must show that they are entitled to payment for the services
they provide to Medicare beneficiaries. 25 1 The Constitution does not
create property rights; "[r]ather [property rights] are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits." 25 2 The Medicare statute can be read to create this
entitlement, noting the following with respect to Part A providers:
the Secretary shall periodically determine the amount which
should be paid under this part to each provider of services
with respect to the services furnished by it, and the provider of
services shall be paid, at such time or times as the Secretary
believes appropriate (but not less often than monthly) ... .25
Perhaps the best evidence of this entitlement is the fact that CMS
pays the provider for services rendered before completing its postpayment reviews.

250. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)
("But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first
place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest
at stake. We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty and property.") (internal citations
omitted).
251. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71 ("To have a property interest in a benefit, a
person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.").

252. Id. at 577.
253. 42 U.S.C. 1395g(a) (2010) (emphasis added).

308

HEALTH MATRIX - VOLUME 28 - ISSUE 1 - 2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

Mathews v. Eldridge25 4 established the modern test for evaluating
whether an agency provided due process before it affected a party's
liberty or property interest. Mathews followed in the footsteps of
Goldberg v. Kelly-where the Supreme Court held that an agency could
not deprive individuals of their welfare benefits without first providing
welfare beneficiaries with a pre-deprivation ALJ hearing. 25 5 Mathews
constrained Goldberg 's holding by limiting the incidences in which
agencies must provide a pre-deprivation hearing. 25 6 Recognizing that
such a requirement can come with significant governmental costs, the
Court created a balancing test to weigh the various hiterests at stake:
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional procedural or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3]
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail .257
After weighing these factors in a new context-disability benefitsthe Mathews Court held that it was constitutional to deprive
individuals of their disability benefits prior to an ALJ hearing i.e.,
that a pre-deprivation hearing was not required for disability
beneficiaries as it had been for welfare beneficiaries. 258
Mathews did not overturn Goldberg.259 Though Mathews involved a
nearly identical claim to Goldberg, the Court distinguished itself from
Goldberg on three factors. First, it found that the deprivation of welfare
benefits was more significant than the deprivation of disability
benefits. 26 0 Second, it found that a pre-deprivation hearing in the
disability context was marginally less beneficial than in the welfare
context. 261 Finally, the Court concluded that the government's burden

254. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

255. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
256. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342.

257. Id. at 335.
258. 43 U.S.C. § 405(5) (2017).
259. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 355.
260. Id. at 342 ("Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private
resources, other forms of government assistance will become available
where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family
below the subsistence level.").
261. Id. at 343-44 (" [A medical assessment] is a more sharply focused and easily
documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. In [welfare hearings], a wide variety of information may be deemed
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in providing a pre-deprivation hearing in the disability context was high
and outweighed the beneficiaries' hiterests (unlike in the welfare
context) 262
To whi a due process challenge, providers would need to argue that
their due process claims are more similar to Goldberg than Mathews
and that the balancing test favors them. Courts are generally reluctant
to require agencies to provide additional process. Small providers,
however, could realistically argue that this is an exceptional
circumstance given the severe financial ramifications, high likelihood of
success before an ALJ, and low governmental cost. In so doing, they
might have to concede that when the System functioned normally, it
was not constitutionally deficient. 263
a.

The Severity of the Interest Affected

The severity associated with the property deprivation is a
significant part of the balancing test. I Goldberg, the Court worried
that an erroneous deprivation of welfare benefits could render
beneficiaries destitute; "thus, the crucial factor in this context . . . is
that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which
to live while he waits." 264 Conversely, in Mathews, the Court relied
significantly on its view that an erroneous deprivation of disability
benefits would be less likely to threaten a beneficiary's ability to
survive, stating: "still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less
than that of a welfare recipient . . . other forms of government
assistance will become available where the termination of disability
benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence level." 265 In
other words, the Court reasoned that because disability beneficiaries
could obtain other forms of assistance, like welfare, if they become
destitute while waiting for an ALJ determination, they were less likely
to suffer extreme hardship if their disability benefits were erroneously
deprived in the meantime.

relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to
the decision making process.").
262. Id. at 347-49.
263. See e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making And
Appeal Procedures: Can Process Meet The Challenge Of New Medical
Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461 (2003) (exploring due process
in the Medicare Appeals System long before the delays began in the
context of challenging Medicare coverage determinations).
264. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis added).
265. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342.
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Erroneous deprivation of Medicare payments while providers wait
for an ALJ hearing forces many businesseS 266 to face the corporate
equivalent of the harm announced in Goldberg: bankruptcy. 26 7
According to Goldberg, when a property deprivation threatens the "very
means by which to live while [the beneficiary] waits," the deprivation
is severe. 26 8 There is no more severe consequence to a business than
facing dissolution as it waits for the government to correct its erroneous
deprivation. One practical implication is that small providers genuinely
facing dissolution are the best positioned to prove the requisite level of
severity under the Due Process Clause. As a result, it is unsurprising
that the two plaintiffs who have successfully raised this claim were
small providers. 26 9
Another factor that can impact severity is the length of the delay. 270
If the delay is so long that a party cannot be heard "at a meaningful
time," then the deprivation is more severe. 271 In Mathews, the Court
noted that the average wait for an ALJ hearing was between ten and
eleven months. Though the Court found that timeframe "torpid[]," it
was not so severe as to outweigh the court's findings on the other
factors. 272 The delays faced by Medicare providers are years longer than
266. A Medicare provider's due process challenge affects businesses as opposed
to the individuals affected in Goldberg and Mathews. Because the Supreme
Court has held on numerous occasions that corporations and business
associations are guaranteed the same Fourteenth Amendment rights as
natural persons, the fact that Medicare providers are businesses should
not affect the analysis in any legally relevant way. Pembina Consolidated
Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) ("Under the
designation of 'person' there is no doubt that a private corporation is
included [in the Fourteenth Amendment]. Such corporations are merely
associations of individuals united for a special purpose and permitted to
do business under a particular name and have a succession of members
without dissolution."); Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906)
("It is true, also, that a corporation of one state, doing business in another
state, under such circumstances as to be directly subject to its process at
the instance of suitors, may invoke the protection of that clause of the
14th Amendment which declares that no state shall 'deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."').
267. Press Release, supra note 52. Not all healthcare providers are seriously
affected by the property deprivation. In particular, large hospital chains
might be well suited to absorb the delays. As a result, this challenge might
need to be made on an as-applied basis.
268. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 340.
269. DUG Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 798; see Hospice Savannah, Inc. v.

Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015).
270. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379,

389 (1975)).
271. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
272. Id. at 341-42.
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those at issue in Mathews and grow every month. 273 Because of them,
some small providers may 11o longer exist by the time of their hearing,
which supports the argument that they could not be heard at a meaningful time.
b. The Likelihood That an ALJ Hearing Would Improve Agency Decision
Making
The second factor of the Mathews analysis "is the fairness and
reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards." 274 The fundamental
inquiry is whether adding procedural protections before property
deprivation will improve the reliability of the outcomes. 275 Here, the
additional safeguard would be an ALJ hearing before recoupment. ALJs
provide two primary procedural protections that are lacking in Reconsideration and Redetermination. First, ALJ hearings provide the hiitial
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 276 Second,
OMHA-the agency under which ALJ hearings occur-is located under
HHS, not CMS, and its ALJs are therefore less susceptible to bias.
A fair hearing "require[s] that a recipient have . . . effective opportunity to defend themselves by confronthig any adverse witnesses and
by presenthig his own arguments and evidence orally." 277 It is
undisputed that an ALJ hearing is the first point that providers can
present evidence and raise their arguments orally before an arbiter.278
The GAO, for histance, attributed the "high reversal rates at Level 3
[i.e., the ALJ hearing], in part, to the opportunity for hearings and
presentation of new evidence . .
"279 As the GAO noted, ALJ hearings
"provide an opportunity for appellants to explain the rationale for the
medical treatment." 28 0 For many providers, the chance to present
evidence and explain their decisions creates the difference between an
"overpayment" and valid claim.
ALJs are also the first instance in which a truly independent
decision-maker hears the appeal. When considering neutrality in the
agency context, "there is wisdom in recognizing that the further the
tribunal is removed from the agency and thus from any suspicion of

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra Section II.

277. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68.
278. See GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 22.

279. Id.
280. Id. at 23.
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bias, the less may be the need for other procedural safeguards." 28 1 The
arbiters in Reconsideration and Redetermination are Medicare
contractors employed by CMS; their mission includes protecting the
Medicare trust funds and identifying potential overpayments. 28 2 These
contractors are essentially asked to judge a conflict where their
employer is one of the parties. This creates an incentive adverse to the
providers, who want to get paid for all of the services they provide.
ALJs, on the other hand, are employed by a different agencyOMHA- and are therefore an external arbiter that is less likely to
prioritize CMS's interests.
One mechanism to assess whether Reconsideration and Redetermination are reliable and fair is the likelihood of a reversal before a
tribunal that provides additional process. 283 In Mathews, the Court
found that ALJs only reverse 3.3 percent of appeals involving a person's
eligibility for disability benefits. 284 This is in stark contrast to a
provider's likelihood of obtaining a reversal before an ALJ of their
payment's recoupment. CMS's 2014 data indicates that 54 percent of
ALJ appeals fully reversed the underlying decision. In 2012 and 2013,
ALJs overturned more than 60 percent of underlying decisions. 285 As
the D.C. Circuit has stated: "if the vast majority of these delayed [ALJ
Medicare] appeals were ultimately denied, they might amount to little
more than an unfortunate nuisance. The record suggests, however, that
many have merit." 28 6 This high reversal rate indicates that
Reconsideration and Redetermination are not sufficiently protective of
providers' property interests and an additional safeguard-an ALJ
hearing could be warranted.
c. The Government's Conflicting Interest
The final Mathews factor to consider "is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that would
be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an
evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination
281. Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,

1279 (1975).
282. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
283. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319, n.29 ("As we indicated last Term in Fusari v.
Steinberg [], in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system
of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error for all denials
of benefits." )(quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 383 n. 6 (1975)).
284. Id. ("Here, that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these
reversals occur at the reconsideration stage of the administrative
process . . . . Netting out these reconsideration reversals, the overall
reversal rate falls to 3.3%.").
285. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 21-22.
286. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 812 F.3d at 188.
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of disability benefits." 28 7 In Mathews, if the Court had required the
government to provide a pre-deprivation hearing before discontinuing
disability benefits, it would have forced the government to continue
paying disability beneficiaries for ten to eleven months who may have
11o longer been eligible for benefits. And because the ALJ hearing almost
always found for the government, those payments would have been
erroneous 96.7 percent of the time. 28 8 The Mathews Court relied heavily
on the potential cost of these erroneously paid disability benefits, most
of which the government could never recoup given the financial
circumstances of the population. 28 9 It furthermore worried that this lost
money could have been used to provide additional benefits to qualified
individuals. This final factor was ultimately the reason the Court held
that a pre-termination hearing was not required in the disability
29 0
context.
The cost of a pre-termination hearing for Medicare providers would
be negligible for two reasons. First, unlike disability beneficiaries who
would have been paid monthly sums as they waited for their ALJ
hearing, 29 1 Medicare providers are challenging a past transaction that
the government paid for long before the appeal. In other words, a predeprivation hearing for Medicare providers would not cost the
government any additional money given that payment had already been
made. 29 2 Second, the agency has a strong self-help mechanism against
providers to ensure it will be paid back: recoupment. 293 If an ALJ
determines that a true overpayment has occurred, the agency can
immediately recoup the money by ceasing all future Medicare payments
to the provider. 29 4 This is not a remedy available in the disability
context, where beneficiaries are receiving government assistance, not
payment for services rendered. Finally, given the underlying systemic
issues that are perpetuated by these delays, it is in the public's interest
to create a reprieve for these small providers.
Taken together, a court could find that the Mathews factors balance
in favor of small Medicare providers. Because small providers are more
severely harmed the delays than large providers and their financial risk

287. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42.
288. Id. at n.29.

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(C) (2017) and MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note
84, at 14.

292. 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(D) (2017).
293. Id.
294. Id.
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more seriously impacts public interest concerns, they are best positioned
to bring a successful due process challenge.
d. Early Victories Suggesting that a ProceduralDue Process Challenge
Could Be Successful
Two small providers have recently been successful at obtaining preliminary relief to prevent the government from recouping their
Medicare payments before an ALJ hearing. In Hospice Savanah, the
Southern District of Georgia entered a temporary restraining order to
prevent the government from recouping a small hospice provider's
Medicare payments prior to an ALJ hearing. 29 5 The court found that
the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits and be irreparably
harmed if the recoupment were not enjoined because "Hospice
Savannah will lose 80% of its total revenues and be . . . forced to
close. "296
In a similar case a few months later, DUG Holdings, the Western
District of Louisiana granted a preliminary injunction preventing CMS
29 7
from recouping overpayments before the ALJ decision:
[P]laintiff states that if it is not granted a timely administrative
hearing and recoupment continues in the interim, it will lose the
same amount of revenue, will go out of business, could not care
for its rural customer base, and must terminate its
employees . . . . These are damages not recompensable through
retroactive payment. A colorable claim that irreparable harm will
8
result has been made. 29
Both cases settled shortly after the injunctions were issued and were
therefore not litigated fully on the merits. 29 9 Nevertheless, both
providers' preliminary victories demonstrate that a due process challenge could be ultimately victorious, as the decisions were based on
findings that, inter alia, the providers were likely to be successful on
the merits.

295. MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 80, at 13.
296. Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253-JRH-GRS, 2015 WL
8488432, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015).

297. DUG Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d. at 817.
298. Id. at 817.
299. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH
(W.D. La. Apr. 26, 2016), ECF No. 99; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc.

v. Burwell,. No. 4:15-cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF
No. 24.
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2.

Legal and Practical Challenges Associated with a Due Process
Challenge

Despite the possibility that a due process challenge could be
successful and provide a unique remedy to providers, plaintiffs would
need to overcome significant legal and practical hurdles. I explore three
of the more pressing obstacles below. Though the legal hurdles are
surmountable, the practical challenges will make it difficult to litigate
the challenge to finality.
a.

Jurisdiction

Providers seeking to bring a due process challenge will face a
jurisdiction hurdle right out of the gate. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precludes
federal jurisdiction prior to administrative exhaustion for claims
"arising under" federal statutes, including the Medicare Act, and that
base their jurisdiction on the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.300 Under Section 405(h), providers are generally prohibited from
bringing federal litigation to challenge Medicare appeals before
completing all four of the System's steps. 301 This requirement would be
quite problematic for those providers that risk bankruptcy while
waiting for the delayed ALJ hearing. The provider might no longer be
in business by the time it has exhausted and can litigate the due process
claim in federal court.
Fortunately, providers should be able to avoid this obstacle to a
due process challenge. First, litigants challenging due process can avoid
Section 405(h) by arguing that their claim is entirely collateral to the
underlying substantive appeal (i.e., that challenging the System's
delays is unrelated to whether or not the provider is entitled to payment
for the underlying service). 302 Second, the administrative appeals

300. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006); Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002, 1010
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Randall D. Wolcott, MD, P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d
757, 764 (5th Cir. 2011). The Administrative Procedures Act does not
grant jurisdiction.

301. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(h) (2006).

302. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 330; see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S.
467,482 (1986); V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020,
1032 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Eldridge suggests strongly that there is room for
a wholly collateral procedural attack, for example, to compel agency
action wrongfully withheld. In other words, to the extent that a provider
could show that a delay during PRRB review is contrary to the statute,
it might well have a cause of action.") (internal citation omitted);

Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000) ("We need
not address whether jurisdiction is present under § 405(g), as we conclude,
after reviewing the briefs of the parties, that the precedential authority of
this circuit establishes that the judgment of the district court, even if not
"final" per se, is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine . . . "); St.
Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 291 (8th Cir. 1976).
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process may be bypassed-and federal question jurisdiction invokedif exhaustion would amount to "no review at all" of the claim.3 03
Providers could argue that this exception is met because they cannot
challenge the System's delays within the System itself, and they may
11o longer exist to challenge the delays in federal court if required to
first exhaust.
Both of these exceptions to Section 405(h) involve a high bar;3 04
nevertheless, the DUG court allowed the plaintiff to bypass 405(h)
under the collateral claim exception. 3 05 The court held that a "ruling on
the merits of Plaintiff's procedural due process claim will involve this
Court in no way with a determination of whether Plaintiff was overpaid
by Medicare, to what degree any overpayment was made, or the
suitability of the statistical extrapolation used to assess Plaintiff's
alleged overpayment."3 06 The court, however, was unpersuaded by the
"no review at all" exception, holding that the exception required a
showing of legal impossibility, which the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate.307
b.

Property Interest

Assuming the court finds jurisdiction, plaintiffs will also face
negative precedent in proving that a potential overpayment constitutes
a constitutionally recognized property interest.3 08 Providers have
303. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 19 (2000) ("[The
Medicare Act] does not apply § 405(h) where application of § 405(h)
would not simply channel review through the agency, but would mean no

review at all."); BP Care v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2005)
("Put another way, "parties affected by Medicare administrative
determinations may sue in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, bypassing
§ 405 preclusion, only where requiring agency review pursuant to § 405(h)
would mean no review at all.").
304. See e.g., Triple a Home Care Agency v. Burwell, No. 4:15CV668 JCH,
2016 WL 728334, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2016) (holding that plaintiff
provide could not meet the collateral claim doctrine because it sought
review of the underlying overpayment determination, which was not
"1collateral. ").

305. DUG Holdings, 812 F. Supp. 3d. at 798.
306. Id. at 815.
307. Id. Arguably, exhaustion could involve a legal impossibility: by the time
a provider reaches federal court after exhausting the four steps in the
System, it no longer has standing to challenge the delays because it is no
longer being affected by them.
308. Providers could also attempt to prove that a constitutionally protected
liberty interest is at stake when the government threatens providers'
ability to continue their chosen profession. Mary Squire proposed that a
constitutionally protected liberty interest can be implicated when a
Medicare provider faces bankruptcy as a result of agency action. Squire,
supra note 213, at 240-42. However, this theory is even less supported.
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historically been unsuccessful in lodging due process claims against the
government.3 09 In particular, courts have not been willing to find a
property interest in future Medicaid or Medicare payments that are
recouped, frozen, or withheld based on findings of potential Medicare
fraud.3 10 No court, however, has examined whether the government's
recoupment of previously distributed Medicare payments based not on
fraud, but a potential overpayment constitutes an unconstitutional
deprivation of property. Though not an easy question, I contend that
once the government transfers possession of the payment to the
provider, the property interest in the payment shifts from the
government to the provider.
The Medicare statute clearly creates a right to payment, but the
question is whether that right is dependent on the claim successfully
passing through post-payment review.3 1 1 The statute and regulations
governing overpayments complicate the issue because they create
procedures by which the government can recoup payments that it has
already made.3 12 Those procedures, however, do not necessarily define
The fact that providers have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
to pursue their chosen profession does not mean that government action
threatening their ability to stay in business impinges on that interest, see
James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional,
Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX L. REV. 1345, 1390-91 (1981).
309. See e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1975); Karnak
Educ. Trust v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 1517, 1519-20 (11th Cir. 1987).

310. ABA v. D.C., 40 F. Supp. 3d 153, 167 (D.D.C. 2014) ("In contrast to a
provider's right to participate in the Medicaid program, there is no
constitutional right to receive Medicaid payments."); Personal Care
Products v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011) ("Nothing in
Texas or federal law extends a property right in Medicaid reimbursements
to a provider that is the subject of a fraud investigation."); Clarinda Home
Health v. Shalala, 100 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 1996) ("we hold that it is
not a violation of due process to temporarily withhold Medicare payments
during an ongoing investigation for acts of fraud."); Chaves County Home
Health Service v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922 23 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Yorktown Med. Lab. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1991)..
311. 42 U.S.C. 1395g(a) (2010) ("the Secretary shall periodically determine the
amount which should be paid under this part to each provider of services
with respect to the services furnished by it, and the provider of services
shall be paid, at such time or times as the Secretary believes appropriate
(but not less often than monthly) . . . .") (emphasis added). The statute

creates prepayment conditions before payment is made, not post-payment
conditions see 42 U.S. Code § 1395f. (2010).
312. The statute and provider agreements are not silent about overpayments.
The statute permits "necessary adjustments on account of previously
made overpayments or underpayments." 42 U.S.C.§1395g(a) (2010). The
right to collect overpayments is also provided in the agreement signed
when providers apply to become a Medicare provider. One provision
requires providers to agree that "any existing or future overpayment made
to the provider by the Medicare program may be recouped by Medicare
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the property interest-if they did, then the legislature (as opposed to
the Constitution) would be designating the scope of due process. The
Supreme Court has found this impermissible.3 13 The legislature creates
property interests, but federal courts define the scope of the Constitution's due process protection. 3 1 4 The Supreme Court described this
distinction in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill by stating: "the
categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. 'Property'
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any
more than can life or liberty."3 1 5 The Loudermill court explicitly rejected
Justice Rehnquist's view in Arnett v. Kennedy"' that when a legislature
grants a substantive right, plaintiffs must accept the limitations placed
upon it.31 7 Thus, the fact that the government can review and recoup
Medicare payments after they are made to providers does not mean
that the property interest does not vest at the time of payment.
Linking a provider's property interest in Medicare payments with
the transfer of property is a plausible interpretation of the Medicare
statute.3 1 8 And once the property interest has been created, only the
courts can decide under what circumstances that interest can be
deprived. Under this theory, the government could still recoup
previously distributed Medicare payments, but only after first providing
sufficient process: an ALJ hearing.
c.

PracticalImplications

A final hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome to achieve a victory on
the merits of a due process challenge is to avoid the pressure to settle.

&

through the withholding of future payments." CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
MEDICAID

SERVS.,

MEDICARE

ENROLLMENT

APPLICATION

48

(2011),

https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMSForms/downloads/cms855a.pdf.
313. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-154 (1974) ("where the grant of a
substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the
procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant
in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.").
317. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
318. This interpretation also has some support in recent case law see ABA, 40
F.Supp.3d at 167 (distinguishing itself from Chaves County Home Health
Service, Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922 23 (D.C. Cir. 1991) on the
grounds that the Chavez plaintiffs "asserted the right to retain payments
already made, circumstances entirely different than those presented here,"
noting that "providers had a property interest in the monies they had
received.").
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The plaintiffs in both DUG and Hospice Savannah settled their lawsuits
as soon as they earned preliminary relief.3 19 CMS was motivated to
settle so that it could avoid thhe possibility of negative precedent on
the merits that would force it to delay recoupment for all providers.
The plaintiffs, fachig insolvency and anxious to reduce the burden of
recoupment, were not in a financial position to reject a favorable
settlement and conthiue their lawsuit. Of course, it is the very fact that
small providers face the threat of bankruptcy that makes their due
process claim possible-the hiterest affected is severe enough to tilt the
Mathews balance in their favor. CMS can use this reality to its benefit
by essentially buying out successful plaintiffs before the merits are
reached.
AHA did not face this same financial pressure and was able to
endure years of litigation before ultimately whinhig a writ of mandamus. It was also not suing as an individual provider hoping to whi a
good result for itself, but as an organization using an impact litigation
strategy to whi a good result for its members. The AHA lawsuit
represented a unique case in which private parties were able to use
litigation to pressure a reluctant agency to act. A similar outcome based
on a due process remedy is possible, so long as a plaintiff can resist the
pressure to settle.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Medicare Appeals System is broken. It cannot accommodate
the influx of appeals that are entitled to ALJ review. Despite the
government's failure to meet its statutory deadlines, CMS conthiues to
recoup payments on schedule as if the delays are not occurring. This
places an extreme burden on providers, whose Medicare payments are
recouped while they wait years for ALJ hearing, which is more likely
than not to determine that the recoupment was erroneous. Small
providers in particular cannot accommodate the years-long deprivation
of their recouped Medicare payments. Legislative and regulatory
solutions have failed thus far. Litigation appears to be the only source
of imminent progress for providers. Though providers were hiitially able
to obtain a writ of mandamus, a successful due process challenge would
better protect small providers, who may be otherwise forced to face
insolvency, sell their bushiesses to larger companies, opt out of
Medicare, or cut patient services to avoid the financial strain associated
with the delays.

319. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH
(W.D. La. Apr. 26, 2016), ECF No. 99; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc.

v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF
No. 24.
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The ultimate solution to the backlog requires congressional action.
Congress must decide to fund additional ALJs to accommodate the
influx of appeals or alter the pipeline of appeals entering the System.
At this point, Congress seems unmotivated to do either. Litigation is
particularly promising because it exerts pressure on the government to
enact lasting reforms. However, if the current legal remedymandamus-remains in effect, it will perpetuate the disproportionate
burdens small providers experience and therefore fail to help the most
vulnerable victims of the System's delays. Though the agency has
rulemaking authority to relieve some of the pressure on small providers
by delaying recoupment, it has been unwilling to do so. A due process
challenge would force the government to implement this change, but
the litigating plaintiff must first overcome numerous legal and practical
obstacles. It might, however, be small providers' best chance at obtaining relief while they wait for Congress to act.
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